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“Humans are not by nature kings, or nobles, or courtiers, or rich. All are born naked and poor. All are
subject to the miseries of life, to frustrations, to ills, to needs, to pain of every kind. Finally, all are
condemned to death. That is what is really the human being; that is what no mortal can avoid. Begin,
then, by studying what is the most inseparable from human nature, that which constitutes humanness”
—Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, Book IV
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Introduction: The Cyprus Question
Since WWII, ethnic conflict has been the most common and the most violent form of
human conflicts. These brutal disputes have inflicted unimaginable human suffering through
the destabilization of entire regions, devastation of economic development, and the
deracination of entire communities. Violent ethnic conflicts have been re-writing the geopolitical map as we know it and forcing colossal changes to the realm of diplomatic relations.
Despite the wide-ranging implications of ethno-conflict, insufficient analysis has been paid to
their resolution worldwide. Most of the culture conflicts drawing our attention today are based
on historic or ancestral claims. Interestingly, ancient history may be a past of glory and honor or
of humiliation and dishonor, or a combination of both, since either can function as a means to
motivate and define a group; this work takes and anthropological perspective on international
ethnic conflict through the examination of the social and biological aspects of ethno-logic.
Specifically, this position will focus its attention on Cyprus – a tiny island located in a region
characterized by fierce nationalism and overburdened by ethnic disputes. At the heart of the
Cyprus Question lies the mystery of affinity, the sense of belonging whether to a nation or to a
people. Ethnic identity plays an important part in day-to-day politics and has even become
politically institutionalized through different systems on germane national or regional levels.
Cultural conflicts highlight the human dimension—a dimension that is primarily one of endless
and often senseless human suffering. Ethnic identities are far from fixed or certain, they are
rather fluid, socially constructed concepts established through territorial boundaries and group
formation. Ethnic identifications are internally and externally constructed and formed in
relation to the outside world. Ultimately, this work uses a holistic approach, with culture as its
focal point, to question and deconstruct cultural claims and group incentive between the two
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competing ethnic groups residing on Cyprus—the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots—
and finally critiques the use of barriers in dealing with ethnic-political conflict.
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Chapter 1: The Anthropology of Ethnic Political Conflict
The disease of mutual distrust among nations is the bane of modern civilizations. – Franz Boas
We do not see things as they are. We see them as we are. – Talmud
Human biology is an extremely general concept. It concerns all biological aspects of
humanity, encompassing elements from atoms and ecology to distinct disciplines such as
human physiology, pharmacology, psychology, medicine, genetics, etc. All of these elements
can be condensed to the term -- biological anthropology (Chapman 47). Ethnicity is a major
factor in marital choices as well as patterns of mating; these factors may potentially lead to a
‗Mendelian‘ population. Conceptually, a Mendelian population refers to a group within which
the majority of individuals find mates for procreation of the next generation. The biological
process can be explained as:
―A totally isolated, endogamous population gradually derives from other populations in the frequencies of its genes,
through the process of mutation, natural selection, and genetic drift. This would result in a distinctive genetic
structure and in discontinuity at the boundaries of the ‗population‘ in genetic marker frequencies and possibly in
other biological measurements. Individuals migrating into the population introduce the genes of the wider human
gene pool; out-migrant‘s spread the genes of the isolated population into the wider population‖ (Chapman 49).

In turn the Mendelian population is defined by the degree of endogamy within the group. The
most reproductively isolated populations are clearest where they have natural barriers (sea,
mountains, etc.) or where they are divided based on religion or other beliefs. However, ‗true‘
isolates are rare or more likely nonexistent whatsoever. Virtually all societies contain social
norms which govern marital choice, and in nearly all cases, marriage is expected to be between
members within the same socially defined community. Furthermore, the social cohesion of a
group depends on group identity and carries on ethnicity (Chapman 51).
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The mission of social anthropology is to consider diversity in history, in cultural
customs, in social systems, and so on. Biological anthropologists on the other hand concentrate
their attention on diversity in gene frequencies, anthropometric measurements, diets, disease,
etc. Self-definition and perception of society, as well as inconsistencies between reported
perceptions are socially significant. The resulting ethnic group can be analyzed based on the
clumping of genetic data. Therefore, both social as well as biological aspects lead to the degree
of a Mendelian population in the way that socially constructed identities lead to a genetically
endogamous community. Ultimately, ethnographic- biological research can be applied
politically to verify ethnic claims. The case of the ‗Cyprus Question‘ is a prime example of how
ethnic groups have made cultural claims to cite ancestral homogeneity. How ethnic groups
manipulate these claims, flaunts them, ignores them, rejects them, depend on the circumstances
(Chapman 83).
Most of the culture conflicts drawing our attention today are based on historic ancestral
claims. Interestingly, ancient history may be a past of glory and honor or of humiliation and
dishonor, or a combination of both, since either can function as means to motivate and define a
group (Eller 31). Commonly, ethnic groups will reference a grand historical military defeat to
evoke memory and emotion, thus stimulating a desire for revenge and redemption which
mobilizes the group even centuries later. However, many question: Are ethnic groups real or
are they a fabrication of the mind of the analyst or ethnic innovator? Anthropology offers
critical specialized perspectives to the treatment of ethnic conflict: 1) a holistic approach,
incorporating, historical, political, economic, and other data into the complete account of social
phenomena; 2) uses culture as its focal point; 3) through the use of well-tuned concepts, it
questions and deconstructs cultural claims to understand group incentive; 4) collects and
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analyzes data respectfully, yet wary of the imposition of foreign distinctions and definitions
(Eller 2). Most states in the world today are in fact plural, many in an extreme and dangerous
way, aggregating groups with no common identity or with real mutual animosity (Eller 2).
Based on some accounts, the world today possesses as many as five thousand distinguishable
ethnic groups or seven to eight thousand linguistic ethnic, or religious ethnic groups in plural
societies (Eller 3).
Violent conflict between countries or ‗states‘ has become less frequent in recent decades,
however, conflict between ‗non-state‘ groups has increased with frequency and ferocity. One
source claims that at least eighty times since WWII, non-state group conflict has escalated into
war, and over two-hundred such groups have structured themselves in a way to promote their
collective interests against governments and other small groups (Eller 1).
―Ethnicity is no mere reflection or reflex of culture, especially of traditional culture, but a complex reworking,
remembering, sometimes reinvention, and always employment of culture in the light and service of present and even
future considerations. Further, culture may as easily hinder as facilitate mobilization. Ethnicity and the conflict that
ensues from it is not purely instrumental or practical, but both are shaped by the conjunction of culture or history as
remembered and of present challenges and conditions and future goals and visions‖ (Eller 5).

In the late twentieth century, emotionally charged episodes of ethnic conflict began to captivate
the world‘s attention like no other social phenomenon had before. The problem with ‗ethnicity‘
is its indefinite and ever expanding domain. The foundations, ‗markers‘, history, and goals of
ethnicity vary from case to case. Cultural anthropologist Jack Eller explains, ―Not all ethnic
groups are ancient organic social entities; some can make that claim, while others are noticeably
recent. Not all ethnic groups are in conflict, not all conflicts are equal in intensity, and not all
conflicts seek the same ends‖ (Eller 8). The elusiveness of ethnicity has have made it one of the
most elastic social concepts.

9
Ethnicity is defined as ―the character, quality, or condition of ethnic group membership,
based on an identity with/ and or a consciousness of a group belonging that is differentiated
from others by symbolic markers (including cultural, biological, or territorial), and is rooted in
the bonds to a shared past and perceived ethnic interests (Eller 8). In addition, ethnicity may be
the maximal case of societally structured intimacy and kinship experience (Eller 9). If a group is
not conscious of, or organized based on distinct characteristics, then there is no ethnic
connection, no matter how unique it may be. Ethnicity is not an objective experience because it
requires an ethnic consciousness – a certain objectification of culture and cultural difference in
relation to one‘s own culture; Therefore, ―People who live there life unproblematically tend not
to be ―ethnic‖ in the proper sense of the word,‖ explains Eller (Eller 11). The classic definition of
the ethnic group provided by Max Weber describes it as ―one of those human groups that
entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities in physical type or
of customs of both, or because of memories of colonization or migration; conversely, it does not
matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exits‖ (Eller 12). Concepts of origin and
decent are regularly maintained in the ideology of group identity, however, it is insignificant
whether these claims are verifiable.
‗Ethnicity‘, in the sense in which we use it in modern social science, is a relatively
modern term, coined around the early 1950‘s and gradually reaching general use in the 1960‘s.
The term itself derives from Ancient Greek ethno- ‗group of people of shared characteristics‘
(Chapman 15). Greeks today use ‗ethnos‘ as reference to intimate self-definition. Modern Greeks
are a representation of the quintessential ethnos (Chapman 18). This notion came about around
the early nineteenth century when Greece basically became an experimental laboratory for
modern nationalism, as the Ottoman Empire began to implode. The pre-existing sense of ethnos
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combined with the semantic and political opposition of the crumbling Ottoman Empire led to
the Modern Greek sense of ethnos as a self-realizing, self-defining power (Chapman 18-19).
Through the use of ethnography (ethnology refers to the ‗study of races‘),
anthropologists have begun to discover and admit that the unit analysis of the cultural world is
not quite as orderly and trimmed as they have been portrayed. Anthropology has revealed the
fact that social identity is a multifarious facet, flexible and negotiable. Groups exist with vague
and permeable boundaries and even the most primitive and isolated tribes are in contact with
other societies (Eller 15). As a species of collectivity the ethnic group lucratively combines
symbolic and instrumental reasoning to clothe practical interests and competitions in the garb
of antiquity, authenticity, and kinship – not to say it is a lie, only a translation – makes ethnicity
and ethnic groups uniquely attractive, uniquely real, and uniquely irresistible to their
opponents (Eller 15).
Nationalism
Malcolm Chapman conceptualizes ethnicity from a social anthropological perspective.
He explains that societies and cultures, however defined, are interested in boundaries.
However, due to the flexible and ever-changing nature of social anthropology the field is
virtually boundless and inexhaustible. He explains, ―No definitive treatment is practically
possible. Any selection of themes must, therefore, be arbitrary to some extent‖ (Chapman 1).
The roots of ethnicity derive from the idea of self-definition. The way people define themselves
based on the manipulation of subjective experiences provides support for modes of selfidentification, in turn it leads to in interest in how people perceive and define others in pursuit
of their own definition. Eventually this gradual recognition of ‗self‘ and ‗others‘ evolves into a
sustained recognition that will later aide in the process of group formation. According to
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Chapman, ―social definition of what constituted a‘ group‘ was often surprisingly independent
of ‗population‘, as defined in terms of positivist biological or genetic science‖ (Chapman 2).
Essential aspects of ethnicity concern the views of insiders and the perceptions of outsiders.
Helen Macbeth explains how, ―Although these views may be two views of the same
classification, and so can coincide, frequently they do not coincide exactly; people on the
outside may not perceive diversity and divisions which are very significant to those within the
group (Chapman 51).
The radical appropriation and application of ―otherness‖ within the practical domain is
likely to deny any common cultural ground between groups so that no other group can refute
the other. These ‗primordial‘ claims are highly corrosive to political integration, because these
claims legitimize a system of unimpeachable values and truths. In this way, ―ethnic groups are
products of a politicized version of cultural relativism,‖ claims Eller (Eller 16). When ethnicity is
coupled with nationalism it results in a whole other breed of social power. The nationalistic
ethnic group is significantly different from the non-nationalistic ethnic group in terms of
relation to culture and political aims. Nationalism serves a population as an ideology as well as
a political movement. It is a form of culture with four goals: 1) Transforming passive ethnic
groups into an active, competitive ethno-political community; 2) Organizing a sense of ―high
culture‖ within the community; 3) Molding the nation into a culturally homogenous organic
nation; 4) and lastly, obtaining a home territory (Eller 22). Nationalist movements seek
recognition, respect, and justice for the culture and its people. Interestingly Eller notes, ―The
mere memory of having had a distinct culture in the past may be sufficient to create and
maintain a sense of nationhood‖ (Eller 25). Nevertheless, nationalism serves as the method of
cohesion in converting the masses into a nation. Typically, ―it is first necessary to vernacularize
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them and thereby bestow a unique identity and destiny upon them‖ (Eller 26). This can be done
through the resurrection of an attractive ancient but decayed ethic identity. The next step is to
create or elevate the concept of a high culture:
―Nationalist leaders (or would-be leaders) may rummage through, for example, peasant cultures for symbols,
behaviors, tales, myths, and the like that can be appropriated, packaged, and ―sold‖ as the national culture and then
re-vernacularized, often from the same people from whom it was lifted. Yet, in the process of collection, assembly,
and interpretation, and vernacularization, what is produced is not the same culture as the ―peasant‖ or ―rural‖ or
traditional culture that was ostensibly discovered‖ (Eller 26).

The perception of ethnic groups and nations is typically presented as an extensive, incessant,
often glorious history of cultural distinctness (as well as conflict) that bestows upon them
sentiments of rights and determinations. As a cultural past or tradition the ethnic group defines
―what we are‖ in terms of ―what we were‖. However, memory is both porous and productive,
and the past is elusive, especially but not exclusively when the past was a preliterate period.
The porosity of memory allows memory to slip in and slip out, rendering the firmest memories
contestable (Eller 29).
European Colonialism
The period of European colonialism was a critical historical period for many groups –
featuring a variety of social and cultural changes to non-Western traditional societies. With little
to no regard for sociocultural boundaries, colonial political boundaries were drawn. In some
cases, groups that previously barely interacted with each other or had a history of hostility were
suddenly pushed into the same colony. While other groups who had more or less a sense of
ethnic consciousness, were divided across two or more colonies. Next, notions of race were
developed to classify people and explain behavioral differences in terms of physical differences
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and then superimposed upon non-Western plural societies. Race was believed to be a real,
distinct, circumscribed phenomenon with a discernable set of traits based on physical rather
than cultural traits. Though,
―The two concepts (physical and cultural traits) work hand in hand, since a set of cultural traits could ideally be
attributed to the group identified by its set of physical traits. Race was often linked to or established on the basis of
cultural characteristics, most particularly language or territory: the thinking was ―every language group a race, and
every race a language group‖ and ―every territorial group a race and every race a territorial group‖. Race was often
even something of a synonym for society or nation (Eller 33-34).

Ultimately race labels not only expressed, ―we are different from you‖ but ―we are better then
you‖. The imposition of foreign power had several social/political implications. One effect was
the actual creation of a new elite, advantaged class. The later stage of colonialism
(paradoxically) featured effort toward some degree of democracy. However, these attempts,
―…have often if not usually had the effect of intensifying group competition and identification; under the practice of
―communal representation,‖ which was viewed at some colonies at some times as the best way to represent all
people and to balance the interests of the constituent groups, group differences were reified, institutionalized and
politicized in unprecedented ways to ensure groups a share of power as groups‖ (Eller 35).

Self-Determination
Throughout the early twentieth century the world witnessed the collapse and
dismemberment of several European empires, notably the Ottoman and Austrian, and the
establishment of new states based on the Wilsonian principal of self-determination. The notion
of self-determination became the first the battle-cry to gain independence from empires (as used
in the late 19th century) or as an attempt to secede from resultant states. Once these ‗new states‘
gained their independence, their social political policies further segmented and created conflict
among ethnic groups (Eller 37-38). Nations are not objective or absolute things, yet unaskable
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questions regarding governance, political representation, cultural institutionalization, economic
development, and educational and occupational opportunity were readily being answered by
colonists. Ultimately, the fulfillment of self-determination within colonial boundaries, often
through the outright use of force, revived or preserved old differences and animosities or
developed new ones.
Past as Myth
Most ethnic groups define and characterize themselves through their real or supposed
common history, descent, or kinship. The ‗myth of common ancestry‘, is often a ―remote and
improvable history‖ says Eller. Myths of ethnicity contain stories of: ―origin; migration and
liberation; of descent; of heroic age; of communal decline, conquest, and exile; and of rebirth,
with a summons to action‖ (Eller 40).
―While many historians try to find out what really happened … most anthropologists would rather concentrate on
showing the ways in which historical accounts are used as tools in the contemporary creation of identities and in
politics. Anthropologists would stress that history is not a product of the past but a response to the requirements of
the present‖ (Eller 40).

The ethnic past-as-myth theory in the purest sense is generally, if not always nostalgia— seen
through the emotional lens of retrospective regrets and longings. Overall, it is a ―complex and
empirically specific amalgamation of remembering, forgetting, interpreting, and inventing‖
(Eller 41). Ethnic groups use past claims as a resource: The ethnic past is a subjective
reconstruction that provides the individuals some cultural, historical symbols to unify around.
Thus the group defines itself based on the mythical character of the past. In addition, these
historical cultural markers serve as a crucial link between the past, present, and future – in
order to give the group basic understanding of the social present and justify claims on it.
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Culture and history are used as tools of struggle and communication to legitimize demands
within the political sphere. In turn, culture is used as a political weapon in diplomatic settings
and not-so-diplomatic settings (Eller 42).
For the most part, ethnicity is essentially a product of modern and modernizing
conditions (Eller 44). The ethnic group is not entirely a ―backward-looking social collectivity‖
nor is it necessarily ―an objective, organic, or unitary one‖, Eller explains, it is very much a
product of the present. It is a product of the past insofar as it is the presence of the past in and
under the operation of circumstances new and unique to the present (Eller 47). On the political
stage, ethnic groups are interest groups –using claims to culture and history as a supporting
weapon.
Herder and European Romantic Nationalism
Each national group argues that it is organic unit, a national organism – unique and
exceptional in natural qualities: genius, language, culture, and spirit. German nationalist
philosopher Johann Herder (1744-1803) developed the theory of ―ethnic consciousness‖. He
understood that, most likely every society in human history has been aware of difference, even
if it has not been relativistic and tolerant of difference; He says terms like heathen, barbarian,
savage, and ethnic in its original sense bear witness to that fact (Eller 50). Herder believed that,
―humanity as a species is on a mission of higher development and achievement but that the
agent of this development is not the species as a whole or as the individual but at an
intermediate-group level (Eller 51). Herder was fascinated by the peculiarity of nationality; He
claimed that in the national unit, ―the group becomes a single being, an individuality, a
personality, in which culture is the national personality, the group mind‖, in addition he
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confessed that nationality and culture are not organic or spontaneous, but rather ―sought,
assembled, protected, and advanced‖ identities (Eller 51-52).
The Foundations of a Social Science of Ethnicity: Early Ethnology, Boas, and Weber
The birth of anthropology as we know it became available through British colonialism
and contact with the indigenous people. Franz Boas, perhaps the first professional modern
anthropologist (originally natural scientist), conducted fieldwork in North America, where he
studied intellectual trends and eventually realized the ways anthropology could contribute to
important social issues such as racism, classism, and nationalism. The field of anthropology is
always concerned with the group more than the individual. Through his fieldwork he
recognizes that primitive societies and tribes are not actually socially and culturally isolated, he
notes that even the simplest groups have been affected or changed by contact with others.
Through his research he successfully and repeatedly deconstructs and debunks the concept of
race arguing: 1) a race is not an objective or demonstrable decent group; 2) there is much
physical variation within a race as between races; 3) there are no clear-cut geographical and
biological lines between races; 4) there is no correlation between race on the one hand and either
mental or cultural characteristics on the other. This is a valuable lesson that has yet to be
learned by all citizens and certainly by all ethnic members and activists (Eller 57). So then, what
exactly constitutes a nation? Interestingly, Boas distinguishes between the two kinds of
nationalism: nationalism of nations and nationalism of nationalities (Eller 58). Ultimately, Boas
approves of the efforts of nations and nationalities to integrate through higher levels of social
integration. However, he does not condone nationalism in the sense of separatism and
particularism and the manner in which it divides people into smaller and less-encompassing
social groupings.
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Symbolism as the Medium of Political Exchange
Thurman Arnold, a witty legal scholar from a half-century ago, observed that all human
conduct and all institutional behavior are symbolic. Human reality is not provided at birth by
the physical universe, but rather fashioned by the subjective experiences of the individual. Each
individual is confronted with an infinite amount of stimuli, because it is beyond human
conception to deal with all of them, the individual must be selective in their perceptions. In
turn, those aspects of the world must be further selected and reduced and fashioned in to
collective mental paradigms that make sense to the individual. This order of simplification and
categorization is largely provided by the symbol system individuals learn as members of a
culture; symbol systems are a primary means through which humans give meaning to the
world. People are generally not even aware that they themselves endow the world with their
own symbolically constructed interpretation of reality, but through symbols humans are able to
create order where there is only chaos (Kertzer 5). In turn, Kertzer explains, ―Ritual serves as an
analytical category that helps us deal with the chaos of the human experience and put it into a
coherent framework‖ (Kertzer 8).
Politics is expressed through symbolism; symbols instigate social action and define the
individual‘s sense of self. The art of politics requires an understanding how symbols are
operative in society and issuing them forth in action. Political figures use rights to construct
political reality for people around them. Through their participation of rights, citizens of the
modern state identify with larger political forces that can be seen only in symbolic form. As
Waltzer puts it, ―The state is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized
before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived‖ (Kertzer 6). Without rites and
symbols there are no nations.
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Kertzer defines ritual as action wrapped in a web of symbolism (Kertzer 9). The purpose
of ritual serves to link the individual with the larger society. The power of ritual stems from the
inextricably linked dimensions of the social matrix and its psychological underpinnings. Kertzer
claims:
―Through ritual the individual‘s subjective experience interacts with and is molded by social forces. Most often,
people participate in ritual forms that they had nothing to do with creating. Even when individuals invent new
rituals, they create them largely out of a stockpile of preexisting symbols, and the rituals become established not
because of the psychic processes of the inventor but because of the social circumstances of the people who participate
in the new rite‖ (Kertzer 10).

Ritual plays a major role in nurturing and expressing a social consensus. Yet, interestingly,
―Ritual can serve political organizations by producing bonds of social solidarity without requiring a uniformity of
belief. This is of tremendous political value, since what often underlies people‘s political allegiances is their social
identification with a group rather than their sharing of beliefs with other members… Beliefs are privately held and in
some sense unknowable, while rituals provide public statements of acceptance of a groups position‖ (Kertzer 67-68).

Therefore, ritual is capable of promoting social solidarity without implying that people share
the same values or even same interpretation of the ritual (Kertzer 69). The genius lies in the
sense that solidarity is produced by people acting together, not necessarily thinking together.
What is pervasive about ritual is the way it actually discourages critical thinking (Kertzer 85).
Ritual is a form of formalized communication that presents a well-defined course of action. Still,
―Rituals are not simply a blind product of communal existence; rather, they serve certain
political interests and undermine others‖, Kertzer explicates; thus they must be examined in in
political terms to determine how they develop, how they are sustained and changed, and who
benefits from them (Kertzer 87).
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Each society has its own mythology detailing its origins and sanctifying its norms
(Kertzer 12). Ritual practices are a major way for propagating these myths. Organizations
propagate myths regarding their origin and purpose, while members engage in symbolic
practices that distinguish them from non-members (Kertzer 17-18). Ritual serves important
communicative purposes within organizations; an organizations political position is often
communicated more effectively and credibly through ritual than simple written platforms or
oral addresses (Kertzer 31). Ritual action is characterized by highly structured standardized
sequences and is often enacted at certain places during certain times that are themselves
endowed with a certain, often more important symbolic meaning (Kertzer 9). Kertzer observes,
―Politics occurs through societal mechanisms that are not themselves seen as political in nature‖
(Kertzer 19). Politics is full of ritual dramas; candidates of election campaigns and the mass
media carefully arrange well-choreographed, symbolically-charged dramatic productions every
day. Symbols provide the context of the ritual. Mass rallies and other demonstrations are
effective in both dramatically exemplifying the groups strength as well as fostering certain
images regarding the nature of the group and its goals, it also allows members to speak directly
to the public and opposition forces—increasing identification with the group and reinforcing
opposition to adversaries.
The information that is received through our senses is processed through preexisting
systems of stigmatized and abstracted knowledge called schemas. Thus there is a strong
conservative bias built into our perceptions and thought processes. Since we interpret what we
encounter on in daily life in terms of pre-established schemas that tell us what to expect,
information that conflicts with our schema is often largely ignored while information that
appears to confirm it is seized (Kertzer 80). Although cognition is often contrasted with
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emotion, they are in fact closely linked. For instance, the more emotionally aroused people
become, the more focused their attention becomes and fewer categories are used to interpret
their experience; on an extreme level, the emotionally charged individual may operate with an
overriding cognitive division of people into just two categories: ―with me‖ and ―against me‖
(Kertzer 82).
What makes the cognitive aspect of ritual so fascinating is and so politically salient is
frequently its connection to particular cognitive messages. Rituals are not only emotionally
compelling, but effective. By repetitively employing a limited pool of powerful symbols
associated with emotional fervor, rituals mold political beliefs. Ritual defines our political
realities but constantly reaffirm our beliefs through regular collective expression (Kertzer 95).
Symbolism is the medium of political exchange; it is an exchange that not only redistributes
political rewards but forms the basis of our political understandings. If symbols and rituals are
used to structure our political realities, is it because we as humans can do it no other way? Yet,
Kertzer makes clear, ―Our symbol system, then, is not a cage that locks us into a single view of
the political world, but a mélange of symbolic understandings by which we struggle through a
continuous series of negotiations, to assign meaning to events (Kertzer 175).
In some respects, ritual is even more important to revolutionary movements and
regimes than to its long established political organizations. In many ways, ritual can be
considered the life blood of revolution. Radical political shifts require strong support to be
institutionalized; this requires people to give up long established habits as well as previous
conceptions of the world (Kertzer 153). Again here, ritual is needed define political regimes and
to identify individuals within those organizations. Ritual is employed to legitimize a wholly
new regime and to delegitimize the old one; this is done through the mystification of an
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emerging dictatorship with symbols of democracy and the creation of solidarity among people
who had vastly different conceptions about what the whole enterprise was about (Kertzer 160).
Rites provide a basis for common identification and communication, a new definition of
political relations, and delegitimating of existing ones. Symbolism is both necessary in
sustaining the governing political order but also essential in overthrowing it and replacing it
with a different political system.
Anthropology
Anthropology is not and cannot be a purely objective, positivistic, observation and
analysis of culture. As with any dialogue, anthropology possesses a vantage point and a culture
of its own. Yet anthropologists do their best to interpret cultures and their histories
evenhandedly. Eller explains,
―Although ethnicity and ethnic conflict are not entirely pure cultural opportunism, and invention (of groups or even
of traits) is not completely without restraint, failure to recognize the contextual, circumstantial, fictive, and political
qualities of ethnicity render it and its resultant manifestations much more obscure, illogical, and fixed than they
really are‖ (Eller 94).

Anthropologists claim, nation building requires the diminution of primordial sentiments to civil
order in which, the whole society can be encompassed by the new civil state (Eller 23). The
social collectivity of nation building has fascinated anthropologists for the past thirty years or
more; they have witnessed and addressed the significance of the ―making and breaking of
nations‖ since the 1960‘s.
Throughout much of the world, political relations have traditionally been founded on an
ideology of common decent. People‘s place in society is developed on the basis of who they
were descended from, and in order to improve their social position they need to do it
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collectively by improving the entire descent group to which they belonged. It is not required,
however, to delve into the archeological record to observe what role ritual has played in
political struggle against local decent based groups. Ritual is a pervasive part of modern
political life yet few people recognize how important it is in modern politics. Political
anthropologist, David Kertzer, explains: ―Because ritual is usually identified with religion and,
since modern Western societies have presumably separated political affairs from religious life,
there is an assumption that ritual remains politically significant only in less ―advanced‖
societies‖ (Kertzer 2). The underdevelopment of studies on the symbolic dimension of modern
politics is due in part to the kinds of empirical methods used in modern science. Symbols
cannot be satisfactorily studied in quantitative terms, nor through surveys or electoral analyses
(Kertzer 7). Yet the reality is as Geertz asserts, ―A world wholly demystified is a world wholly
depoliticized‖ (Kertzer 48). Mystification is a product of human social construction of reality.
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Chapter 2: Cyprus: From Accommodation to Conflict
―I therefore claim to show, not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without
their being aware of the fact‖— Claude Levi-Strauss
―The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie -- deliberate, contrived and dishonest -- but the
myth -- persistent, persuasive and unrealistic‖—John F. Kennedy
The Cyprus Revolt
The volatile recent past of Cyprus has turned the island, often presented in tourist
literature as the idyllic Island of Aphrodite (goddess of love), into a place renowned for hostile
confrontations (Papadakis 1). The notorious Cyprus dispute has caused internal violence both
between the two major ethnic groups and within each ethnic group, leading to war, invasion,
territorial division, population displacement, anti-colonial struggle, and post-colonial
instability. Greek Hellenocentrists stress their primary identification and loyalty to Greece; they
are proud of the Greek nation and being Greeks, therefore they are concerned with continuity of
the present with the past. The ethnic nationalism of Greek Cypriots was primarily focused on
union with Greece. The enosis movement was part of Greek irredentism. The prevailing
ideology of Greek Cypriots was based on liberating ―Greeks still under foreign yoke‖ and
uniting them under one political roof. For the most part, these individuals feel that Cyprus is
relatively unworthy in comparison with the glorious history of Greece, in turn; they would
rather be called Greeks than Cypriots (Papadakis 111). After Sicily and Sardinia, Cyprus is the
third largest Mediterranean island (Couloumbis 26). The cultural presence of Greeks on Cyprus
can be traced to the earliest times of recorded history, and it has been continuous ever since
(Couloumbis 26). The Turkish-speaking community‘s presence on the island began in 1571 after
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the conquest of Cyprus by the Ottoman Turks. The Ottomans owned Cyprus until 1878, when
they leased the island to Britain in return for British support against the Russians. The British
finally converted Cyprus to a Crown Colony in 1925. Remarkably, the Greek and Turkish
Cypriots maintained a conflict-free record throughout the centuries of Ottoman and British
administration (Couloumbis 27). The rise of nationalism during the first half of the twentieth
century spilled over from the mainlands into Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus.
Nationalism proved to be a mobilizing political and psychological force in Cyprus.
The Turkish Conquest of Cyprus
The Turkish conquest of Cyprus was not simply the belated mopping up of the last
remains of the Byzantine Empire, but part of a long-running campaign between Ottoman Turks
and Venice over control of the islands and seaways of the Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus fell to
the Turks in 1571, but was not actually striped from the Venetians until 1669 (Stephens 30). It
took several centuries before the Ottomans were able to take full control of Cyprus;
nevertheless, Turkish dominance lasted a little over a century. At first, the Turks were
welcomed by the Greeks who regarded them as their ―liberators who had delivered them both
from the rapacious rule of the Venetians and the suppression of their church by the Latins‖
(Stephens 36). In addition, the Turks promised the native Cypriots just treatment without
tyranny or provocation. However, the honeymoon period after the defeat of the Venetians was
short-lived; it would only be a matter of time before Greek Cypriots desired new liberators
(Stephens 37). After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, one small, yet strategically important
area escaped allocation: Cyprus. With decolonization pressures developing in the 1950‘s and
60‘s, Cyprus soon developed into a major pain in the neck for Britain, Greece, and Turkey. The
three NATO allies soon entered a ―dangerous collision course‖ because each believed that their
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national interests were at stake (Stephens 41). As the unquestioned leader of the Western
Alliance, the United States received the task of forming a strategy that would lead to a
diplomatic settlement (Couloumbis 26).
Greece and Turkey have been rivals since the Middle Ages and distrustful allies since
their admission to NATO in 1952. Cyprus has been a ―bone of contention‖ between them
(Stearns 2). The United States has not had easy relations with Greece, Turkey, or Cyprus.
Cyprus is a divided state featuring Turkish troops to the north and Greeks occupying the South.
Since joining NATO, Greece and Turkey have on the verge of war six times over Greek and
Turkish differences over the Aegean continental shelf, territorial air and sea space, militarycommand-and-control arrangements, as well as the interpretation of treaties. The United States‘
relationship with Greece and Turkey has been, ―less a source of mutual reassurance than of
mutual recrimination‖ (Stearns 3). The US policy towards Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus has been
one exclusively devoted to Soviet containment in the Aegean and Mediterranean. Greece and
Turkey are the United States‘ most distant NATO allies. Unresolved Greek-Turkish issues have
hit the fan through a series of crises in Istanbul in 1955, in Cyprus 1963-64, 1967, and 1974, as
well as numerable hostile situations in the Aegean (Stearns 5). The United States has been
reluctantly forced to make many diplomatic decisions over the Cyprus Question.
The modern history of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey was initiated in the 1820s with a
series of massacres. In March 1823, Turkish villagers were slaughtered in the Peloponnese
during the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence. The Turkish Sultan retorted by
publically hanging the Orthodox patriarch on Good Friday, executing the Greek ‗Dragoman of
the Porte‘, and massacring other Greek Christians throughout the empire. In Cyprus, the Greek
War of Independence introduced the ‗fatal western idea‘ of nationality. Previously, Greeks had
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referred to themselves as Romans under the Byzantium. Therefore, there was no such thing as
―Greece‖ until the early nineteenth century, equally there was no such thing as ―Turkey‖ or
―Turks‖ themselves until a century later. Under the Byzantium, Greeks identified themselves by
the Greek religion and/or the Orthodox Christian religion. Thus, there could have been no
enosis movement prior to the war of independence because there was no ―Greece‖ for Cyprus
to unite with. The Greek rebellion ushered a new phase of East European politics. Eventually,
the Cyprus problem evolved into a dispute over the land, language, culture, and political
sovereignty of the region (Stephens 44-45).
How the Struggle Began
The troubled history of Cyprus stems from its strategic position along the main routes
between Europe and Asia. Historically, it has remained at the mercy of the dominant power in
the area because it has been too small to exist by itself. Cyprus has been bought and sold,
transferred from one ruler to another, without inhabitants ever being consulted. In return,
Cypriots have rarely shared prosperity with conquerors, instead, they have been required to
pay taxes to foreign rulers and supply foreign armies with their men and time. In addition, the
island has endured earthquakes, droughts, and famines. Overall, Cypriots have fallen victim to
an extremely turbulent past. However, political disasters since the 1974 Turkish invasion have
been mostly self-inflicted. Archeological and historical evident has proven that the majority of
the population is of a mixed race; nevertheless the most evident element of continuity has been
the survival of Greek language and religion (Loizides 5). In addition, cultural differences also
exist in the architecture and landscape: Turkish houses can be distinguished by their preference
of wooden balconies and shutters and construction around a courtyard. Greek architecture on
the other hand, reflects the neo-classical form of ancient Greece. From childhood forward, the
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average Greek Cypriot is conditioned in church and school to believe that all Greek speaking
communities are supposed to be united with the Motherland; This very concept of a ‗Greater
Greece‘ has inspired nationalism and advocated the struggle for enosis (Loizides 8). Greek
Cypriots claim their descent from the early Aegean colonists who arrived around the ninth
century B.C. Although many ‗Greeks‘ came to inhabit the island, Greece itself at no point, ever
controlled Cyprus (Loizides 10). In A.D. 45, Apostles Paul and Barnabas converted the island to
Christianity. For over three hundred years, Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived in relative peace;
the joint cultures based their common ground on a shared hostility towards their foreign
oppressors. Greeks blame the inter-communal friction of modern times on Britain‘s ‗divide and
rule‘ tactics. Although Turkish Cypriots make up the minority of the population, they had little
to fear as long as the island belonged to Turkey. When the Greek War of Independence spurred
the enosis movement, Turks felt threatened by the power of the Church in Cyprus so they
publicly executed the Archbishop and other leading Christians in 1821 and from this point on
Greek-Turkish relations ventured on a gradual path of disintegration -- leading first to civil
strife and eventually war (Loizides 13). Turkish Cypriots are mostly Sunni Muslims. Unlike
their Greek counterpart, they have never been subject to foreign rule prior to the British
administration (which was still under consent of their own sultan) (Loizides 14). The social
structure of Cyprus is deeply ingrained with separatist trends. Socially, Greeks and Turks rarely
mingle; in fact, intermarriage is forbidden without outright conversion to the other side. Even in
mixed villages, people lead separate lives of voluntary segregation. Even on a personal level,
Greeks and Turks also exemplify differences in temperament and mentality (Loizides 21).
Britain‘s interest in Cyprus has always been purely strategic; Nevertheless, British
administration has always been tolerant of Greek nationalism. After Turkey fought alongside
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Germany in WWI Britain annexed Cyprus; without commitments to the Turkish sultan Greek
Cypriots argued for union with Greece. Winston Churchill wasn‘t opposed to the idea either, in
1907 he wrote: ―I think it only natural that the Cypriot people, who are of Greek decent, should
regard their incorporation with what may be called their Motherland as an ideal to be earnestly,
devoutly, and feverishly cherished‖. In 1915, Great Britain wanted to enlist the Greeks into the
entente ranks of World War I so they offered Cyprus to the neutralist Greek government under
control of King Constantine I in condition for Greek military support, Britain offered Greece
Cyprus. However, the offer was rejected by German-leaning Constantine, thus the opportunity
to attain the important Greek objective was passed. After World War II and throughout the
Cold War, Britain ―appeared determined to maintain control over strategically located Cyprus‖
(Crawshaw 17).The absence of political violence gave the British the impression that the enosis
movement was of little concern. In 1923, Greece and Turkey accepted British rule over Cyprus
in the Treaty of Lausanne (once again without consulting the actual inhabitants of Cyprus first).
In 1928, the British decided to celebrate their anniversary since occupation, this antagonized the
Church and all enosis supporters; in response, the Church ordered all Greeks to boycott British
ceremonies and encouraged boisterous demonstrations. In return, this inspired counteragitation by the Turks who were opposed to any form of government that would bring them
under Greece (Crawshaw 18). In 1929 a small Turkish Cypriot party formed which advocated
the return of Cyprus to Turkey. British statesmen demonstrated insensitivity towards Cypriot
aspirations; they dismissed the position by insisting that Cyprus has never been a part of Greece
(Crawshaw 20). The enosis movement and failure to establish self-government have been the
fundamental roots of the present catastrophe in Cyprus. In 1931, tension increased when the
Chancellor or the Exchequer‘s statement announced that the accumulated surplus from Cyprus
revenues due to Turkey as a tribute under the 1878 Convention had instead been disposed of as
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the sinking fund for the Turkish loan guaranteed by the British and French (Crawshaw 25).
Elected Greek members refused to meet the substantial deficit though additional taxation. In
response, the Greek Orthodox Church engaged in a series of inflammatory speeches and rioting
broke out after enosis agitators burnt the Government House to the ground. The British Navy
was called in to restore order in Cyprus. As a resolution, the Constitution was outlawed in
Cyprus and the state was thereafter ruled by degree. Peace remained in Cyprus until the British
government passed three new laws. According to the Cyprus administration, the affairs of the
Church and monasteries could now be investigated by the government and their accounts
audited (Crawshaw 27). In addition, any archbishop who is either deported or convicted of a
crime worthy of imprisonment loses his status as archbishop for two years. These measures
caused massive upheavals in ecclesiastical conferences (Crawshaw 29).
The Cyprus Question
Cyprus nationalists realized they could achieve nothing without the support of the
Greek mainland. For a period, Cyprus Question was deliberately avoided by the Greek
government in order to not humiliate Britain. Cypriots realized that without the support of a
member state, they were at a dead end. The first Greek appeal to the UN was entirely
disappointing; despite this pressure they were informed that they had already missed the
deadline for the General Assembly‘s agenda. However, Greek bishops in the United States and
AHEPA were eager to help their cause (Couloumbis 21). Fortunately, the AHEPA was able to
play a major role in the Cyprus struggle without interference from the US authorities because it
involved the organization of a cultural society. In 1950, the Cyprus affairs branch of the AHEPA
took their position to the State Department where they drew attention to the British
government‘s refusal to see the Cypriot delegation and the need for US intervention. However,
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the West already had their hands full with the war in Korea; therefore, the State Department
was unsympathetic to the issue (Couloumbis 24). In 1950, Archbishop Makarios III heralded an
era of brilliant and intensive campaigning for enosis. Within a year Makarios had built wide
range of contacts within the Greek political world. The relentless incompetence of British
politicians and spokesmen hindered the Greek government‘s efforts to develop a moderate
policy over Cyprus (Crawshaw 57-62). In 1952, the Cyprus question began to dominate Greek
political life. By 1953, Makarios sent the UN a notice requesting the organization to urge Britain
to respect the Cypriot people‘s right to self-determination. In addition, he asked Papagos and
the Greek Government to back Cyprus with an appeal to the UN. He told Papagos: ―We are
entitled to, and demand, such support because what the Cypriots want is not self-government,
or autonomy, or independence, but union with Greece‖. If Greece failed to help, Makarios
implied (threatened) that Cyprus would turn to ―foreign sources‖, referring to the Soviet Union
(Crawshaw 70).
EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) was established as an anti-British
terrorist network. George Grivas was the leader of the military coup. He was a Cypriot-born,
Right-Wing army officer, whose logistical influence could be clearly traced back to Athens
(Couloumbis 28). EOKA practiced propaganda by the deed by committing acts of sabotage
against British military targets as well as Cypriots who issued soft attitudes towards British
colonial authorities. At the same time, Greek Cypriots such as Archbishop Makarios dealt with
the struggle for self determination politically;many Greek-Cypriots felt gaining support from
the United Nations would be the best way to achieve a secure settlement (Couloumbis 28). The
US hoped for a quiet resolution between the ―UN family‖ so they discouraged the Greeks from
taking the Cyprus Question to the UN. The Greeks however, felt outnumbered within NATO

31
and preferred the multinational setting of the UN and the idea of settling the issue through
public diplomacy (Couloumbis 28). American efforts were intended to prevent Cyprus from
disturbing the smooth functioning southeastern flank of NATO. ―The US tendency in the 1950s,
therefore, was to counsel quiet diplomacy and the avoidance of using the UN as a means for
embarrassingly airing the NATO family‘s dirty linen‖ (Couloumbis 30).
The Climax in 1954
The concept of enosis in Greece had become a nation-wide obsession. In 1954, Lord
Winster initiated a debate in the House of Lords, attempting to describe the general picture of
the islands history. He explained that although Greece had never actually owned Cyprus, they
still had ‗some shadowy claim based on the division of the Roman Empire into the East and
West‘. He determined that Britain‘s international obligations accompanied by Turkish
objections ruled out any chance of them giving up Cyprus (Crawshaw 80). Ultimately, the
House of Lords decided that the issue wasn‘t one to be of grave concern. A few months later,
Greece sent to friendly foreign states a message addressing Britain‘s repeated refusal to hold
bilateral talks as the basis for taking the matter to the UN. The British government did their best
to keep the issue out of public light in order to prevent controversy. During the first Greek
appeal to the UN, speaker Alexis Kyrou explained that Greece was forced to revert to the UN
for help because the British government denied direct negotiations and deprived the Cypriots
their right of self-determination (Crawshaw 83). Under the terms of article 2(7), the discussion
of Cyprus was left inadmissible. Australia and France voted against Greek appeal, Columbia,
Netherlands, and the US abstained, and nine delegations voted in favor of Greek appeal. In the
following debate, the British prime minister argued that Cyprus was essential to Britain for the
treaty obligations to the Arab states, for commitments to the northern flank of the North
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Atlantic Treaty Organization, and for the protection of Turkey and Greece themselves. Britain
said that their policy towards Cyprus reflected the best interests of the Aegean and Middle East
countries as well as the global world (Crawshaw 84). Ultimately Britain was arguing their case
on the grounds of strategic priorities and the correctness of international law. Another speaker,
Krishna Menon, was concerned that the people of Cyprus and been overlooked. He feared that,
―very soon it would become a free-for-all, instead of ‗the homeland of the Cypriot nation‘‖. He
disagreed with the British Minister‘s strategic arguments stating, ―We regard nationhood as
territorial; it makes no difference to us whether in any particular territory, people are of one
ethnic group or another‖ (Crawshaw 85). After Menon‘s argument, thirty votes were cast in
favor of Greek appeal, nineteen against, and eleven abstentions. There was a period of hopeful
expectancy following the UN preliminary success. During this period, the Cyprus struggle was
promoted in America and Britain. In addition, in its broadcasts to Cyprus, the Athens Radio
attacked the constitutional proposals indicating enosists were still preoccupied by the fear that
self-government, however limited, would upset any chances of union with Greece (Crawshaw
85). Greece and Turkey were now publically clashing over Cyprus and endangering the
delicate nature of balancing alliances that had only been recently concluded.
Changes of 1957
Britain‘s strategic requirements had significantly changed by mid-1957. The Suez fiasco
of 1956 had surfaced issues regarding concealed military misgivings in military circles about the
merits of Cyprus as a base; Britain no longer needed the island in conjunction with a complex of
middle-east bases and treaties, many of which had ceased to exist (Crawshaw 258). The Defense
of White Paper in April 1957 brought about the first hint of change, announcing the British
government‘s decision to reduce its overseas military commitments. Previously, Britain‘s role in
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Cyprus was to be a ‗holding operation‘ pending a settlement that was acceptable to Greece,
Turkey, and Cyprus. The second hint of change was obvious in Greece, once a distraction, the
Cyprus issue now evolved as a major priority for the Greek Government. In order to resolve the
issue, Greece felt they needed to first become a full member of NATO and restore relations with
Turkey. By 1957, Greek statesmen were prepared to discuss the independence of Cyprus under
international pledge. By 1957, the prospects of sovereignty as a political solution had slightly
improved. The Greek Government was also doing its best to shift the stand of hostility to that of
détente with Turkey (Crawshaw 258-262).
The Twelve Session of the UN General Assembly entailed: 1) the application under the
UN of the principal of equal rights and self-determination of the peoples etc. in the case of
Cyprus. 2) Violation of human rights and atrocities by the British Colonial Administration
against the Cypriots. In addition, Since Resolution 1013, a permanent representative of Greece
noted that after two months, no progress had been made; in turn Cypriot compliance with the
Resolution had merely resulted in unilateral violence toward the Cypriots (Crawshaw 266).
Tyranny still reigned in Cyprus. Meanwhile, Selim Sarper spoke on behalf of the Turkish
delegate; Turkey supported the possibility of self-determination but was opposed to using it as
a cloak for annexation. Sarper claimed that separatism was already inherent within the social
structure of Cyprus but terrorism organized by extremists from Greece had strained the GreekTurkish relations to the point of hostility which made corporation between them impossible. In
addition, Sarper noted that Turkey had not always been aligned with Britain, yet Turkish
officers and men could testify the honorable manner in which British officers carried out their
duties in Cyprus. Ultimately, Sarper blamed the turmoil in Cyprus on Greek terrorism
(Crawshaw 268). The Greek case we restated by Savvas Loizides, a Cypriot nationalist and
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Greek subject; Loizides begged the committee to read The Violation of Human Rights in Cyprus,
which had been recently published by Ethnarchy. Loizides used an Article from the Sunday
Dispatch as supporting evidence, and then concluded with the support for self-determination.
He said every hesitation on part of the UN to settlement would result in ―more bloodshed, more
pain, and horror in prison and concentration camps and interrogation rooms‖ (Crawshaw 269).
The UN debate was then followed by a brief period of calm.
Paving a Way for Independence
Political developments by the end of 1958 demonstrated that the concept of
independence for Cyprus was not new. America was now in complete support with the British
on the issue of self-determination. The Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church said to base
the next Greek appeal on self-determination before the British imposed a partnership plan that
would most likely end up in partition. The British government was no longer opposed to
granting the Cypriots full independence, however, they felt that premature attempts to push the
issue would inevitably intensify racial tension on the island. After renewed attacks by the
EOKA, the British government decided to follow their plan (Crawshaw 322-323). Meanwhile,
the EOKA continued to attack through autumn and winter, causing mass casualties and a
significant number of bomb explosions in the NAAFI quarters. The bid for independence at the
UN began November 25, the first speaker was the Greek Foreign Secretary, Evanghelos Averoff,
launched a sharp attack on Britain and Turkey noting Britain‘s disregard for Resolution 1013, he
said the Macmillan Plan was evidence of the murderous knife of partition, and that British talks
and conferences were merely a maneuver and attempt to block UN action. He also accused
Turkey of attempting to revive the Ottoman Empire, as well as ignoring the Treaty of Lausanne;
finally he argued the partition of Cyprus was a Turkish territorial claim that reflected
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expansionist ambitions (Crawshaw 329-330). Commander Noble, from the British delegate
focused on Britain‘s efforts in the Cyprus problem stressing the international aspects, including
the abortive NATO initiative, to find a solution. Britain‘s willingness to share sovereignty of the
island with Greece and Turkey after seven years indicated her retention of the island on the
present basis that there should be no obstacle to final settlement. However, Fatim Zorlu, the
Turkish Foreign Minister accused the Greek Government‘s independence proposal to be a
tactical move and a procedural rewording of its demand for enosis. He also blamed the
Cypriots of trying to wipe out the Turkish minority, and held the Greeks primarily responsible
for the inter-communal strife. Zorlu concluded that if independence or self-determination was
granted to Cyprus, it must be granted equally to both communities (Crawshaw 330). AngloCypriot talks continued until July 1960 and eventually these discussions paved way for
independence. The Constitution, which took over a year to finish, had now been prepared for
several months. Eighty-two years of British rule was bought to an end. The war against the
British had been waged in the name of anti-colonialism and self-determination, for this was in
keeping with the trend of the day and the easiest and most efficient way to gain international
support (Crawshaw 362-363). However, the enosis struggle would soon be renewed, this time
uniting both Greeks and Greek Cypriots in direct conflict against the Turks, which would
progress into Turkish invasion and occupation in the northern region of the island. The birth of
the republic only symbolized the calm before the storm (Crawshaw 361-363).
The Compromise of 1960
Forging the nation state proved to be more tedious than ever expected, and the
Compromise of 1960 of a bi-ethnic state was the only alternative left, the Compromise produced
an even more divided population than ever, ones based on dual loyalties and identities.
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―Most Greek Cypriots considered independence to be the first step towards enosis. When the realization gradually
grew that this was no longer a feasible goal, simmering intra-ethnic tensions began to escalate. Makarios, who had to
worry about inter-communal rivalry, threats from Turkey, and strained relations with Greece, was forced to
increasingly distance himself from ethnic nationalist goals, and in 1968, he declared that enosis, though still the
―ideal‖ goal, was nevertheless hardly realizable, signaling his turn to the more realistic policy of supporting
independence‖ (Papadakis 103).

Cyprus nationalism gained prominence in the years following 1974, after what became referred
to as—The Great Betrayal of Greece – followed by a belated appreciation of the benefits of
independence; enosis was declared officially dead, and reunification of the island became the
new goal to strive for. Cypriots who thought in these terms, formed the Neo-Cypriot
Association, emphasizing to think first as Cypriots then as Greeks or Turks. Members promoted
love of country, values of understanding between its communities, the consolidation of a
democratic way of life, and identifying as a Cypriot above all (Papadakis 104). They hold
Greeks responsible for destruction of biblical proportions: forty percent of the land came under
Turkish control, a third of the population was displaced, hundreds of people died and went
missing, the economy was in ruins – altogether the state nearly collapsed. They claim, ―Cyprus
belongs to all Cypriots‖ and they feel that the best way to resolve the Cyprus issue is to
encourage both ethnicities to leave behind whatever separates them to embrace and accept the
other (Papadakis 113).
The Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964 defined the function of the United
Nations force in Cyprus ‗in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its
best efforts to prevent a reoccurrence of fighting and to contribute to the maintenance of
restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions as necessary (Stephens 192). In
the Greek Cypriots eyes, the purpose of the UN was to prevent a Turkish invasion of the island
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and the Turkish Cypriots felt the UN‘s primary function was to protect them from coercion by
the Greek Cypriots backed by Greece. In 1964, the UNFICYP was stationed in Cyprus after it
was suspected that Turkey would attack the island. This fear grew out of unsettled tension
between Greece and Turkey and their support for contending ethnic groups on the island.
When Turkey invaded the northern part of the island in 1974 the UNFICYP attempted to
protect the region. The UNFICYP continues to monitor a tense armistice in Cyprus, from which
despite UN negotiations and mediation, still remains unsettled. Furthermore, in 2004 the Greekspeaking part of Cyprus, on its way to joining the EU, rejected Secretary Annan‘s plan for unity
that had been accepted by the Turkish voters in the north (Baehr-Gordenker 68-69).
Troubled Waters
As the crisis widened in 1974, the view from Turkey was one of grave concern for the
Turkish Cypriot community. At the time, many Turks felt that US leverage was minimal.
Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, was deeply concerned about the rights of Turkish
Cypriots and issued a statement in July, stating the likelihood of a Turkish military reaction to
an Athens-sponsered coup in Cyprus. Henry Kissinger dispatched US Secretary of State, Joseph
Sisco, and ordered him to work out a negociation with Evecit (Couloumbis 89). After a dramatic
meeting on July 19, Evecit icily dashed Sisco‘s hopes of preventing Turkish military action and
ordered his men to attack Cyprus roughly five hours later. The Turkish forces were met by
sporadic resistance from divided Greek Cypriot regimes. The same day the UN Security
Councel kicked into action by passing Resolution 353, calling all states to: respect on another,
cease fire, immediately end foreign military intervention, withdraw, negociate, and coorperate
with UNFICYP (Couloumbis 91). In the heat of the struggle, neither side respected the
Resolution and a de facto partition began developing in Cyprus. After two days, the Cyprus
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cease fire was signed on July 22, which was follwed by the collapse of the Athens junta and
―micro-puppet Sampson regime in Cyprus‖ (Couloumbis 95). As a guarantor state of Cyprus,
Greece had the right to redress the impact of the Turkish invasion because Greece had clearly
indicated in the past that Turkish invasion in Cyprus would result in a Greek-Turkish war.
Greece felt diplomatically and psychologically humiliated after the Turkish invasion. Drastic
times call for drastic measures, so ultmately, in an attempt to diffuse Greek tension, Karamanlis
decided to withdraw Greece from the military arm of NATO. Karamanlis wanted to make a
point to NATO by expressing Greece‘s resentment for NATO‘s unwillingness to respond to the
Turkish forces who attacked Cyprus. Feelings of anger and bitterness swelled in Cyprus and
Greece, which led to anti-American sentiments and passionate demonstrations in front of the
US embassy in Nicosia, which sadly resulted in the sniper shootings of an ambassador and a
member of his staff. Demonstrators were:
―demanding sanctions against Turkeys military aggression, which had been carried out by the use of American
weapons. This spontaneous, grass roots movement ulimately contributed to the congressionally imposed embargo of
military aide and sales to Turkey. This embargo, in turn, fueled the rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey, as well. Thus,
paradoxically, the United States emerged from the July-August 1974 crisis in a much less favorable position than all
three countries‖ (Couloumbis 98).

From 1955-74, Cyprus was evaluated primarily from two distinct positions: The first considered
Cyprus a leftover of the Ottoman Empire that was up for grabs between Greece and Turkey or
both. The second position focused on Cyprus as a distinct political entity that would evolve as a
bi-ethnic state who would come to develop effect constitutional structures which would be
compatible with both cultures. The second position gained popularity after the July-August
crisis when Greek Cypriots realized that the Greek mother-land was both ill equipped militarily
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and too far physically and psychologically to come to their decisive aid. In addition, Greece also
decided that hopes of enosis were no longer practicable or possible.
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Relatives of Greek Cypriots, missing since the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, have appealed to Turkey to provide
information about their whereabouts. They have requested that Turkey allow access to the archives of the Turkish
army and to Turkish prisons to help investigations into the fate of the missing Greek Cypriots. Since Turkish troops
invaded Cyprus and occupied the islands northern third the island has been divided. According to UN data,
approximately 1,468 Greek Cypriots and 502 Turkish Cypriots are listed as missing from the violence.

This picture was taken in 1974 and released by the Cypriot Press and Information Office (PIO). It shows Greek
Cypriot soldiers being taken as prisoners of war by Turkish soldiers who invaded Cyprus following an ethnic
bloodshed that erupted in the Mediterranean island
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Chapter 3: The Search for Peace
―There are three ways of dealing with difference: domination, compromise, and integration. By
domination only one side gets what it wants; by compromise neither side gets what it wants; by
integration we find a way by which both sides may get what they wish.‖
—Mary Parker Follett

The Green Line Revolution
On 23 April 2003, a revolution shook Cyprus: The ―Green Line‖, a 220-kilometer de facto
border that has divided the island since 1974, forming an almost impenetrable boundary
between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities was cast open by Turkish Cypriot
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authorities. By the afternoon, 1,000 Turkish Cypriots and 350 Greek Cypriots ventured to the
other side at the main crossing point at Nicosia, the Cypriot capital contested between the two
communities since 1963 and divided between two jurisdictions since 1974. By that evening,
3,000 Turkish Cypriots and 1,700 Greek Cypriots crossed the four authorized crossing points at
the Green Line (Bose 55). United Nations peacekeeping troops watched in astonishment the
commencement of a barrage of people. By 1 May 2004, 3.7 million crossings had taken place at
the crossing points (Bose 57).
Cyprus‘s total population is about 900,000; three-fourths are Greek Cypriots and onefifth Turkish Cypriots. The rest are Maronites, Armenians, and other minorities (Bose 57). The
frozen conflict of Cyprus was briefly launched into international headlines once again by the
Green Line revolution. On 24 April 2004, exactly one year later, the UN proposed the Annan
Plan for ―the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem‖. The plan sought to construct
the ―United Cyprus Republic‖, which would consist of ―two largely self-governing Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ―constituent states‖, supplemented by a limited central
government constituted and operated on the basis of power sharing and equality between the
two communities‖ (Bose 57). The Annan Plan was supported by 65 percent of the Turkish
Cypriots but rejected by 76 percent of the Greek Cypriots. Failure of the Annan Plan left Cyprus
in a state of de facto partition, expect for the permeable status of the Green Line. However, ―any
passage across the Line in Cyprus‘s divided capital city, Nicosia, conveys the unmistakable
sense of an unresolved conflict suspended in limbo‖ (Bose 57-58).
The ‗Green Line‘, whose name originated in Nicosia during communal violence in 1958
when a British administrator drew a line on a map of the city with a green crayon to identify the
―front line‖, became an iron curtain of 220 kilometers running horizontally through Cyprus
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(Bose 88). The opening of the Green Line and the immense public response rehabilitated hope in
the international community that peace and resolution is possible even after the deadlocked
UN-mediations between Cypriot leaders from just a month before. A Greek Cypriot
anthropologist noted the scene of people crossing the Green Line on April 23, 2003:
―I saw some Greek Cypriots standing [as if] paralyzed at the Ledra Palace checkpoint. They stood still watching
others crossing, with tears flowing down their cheeks. Perhaps it was difficult for them to believe this was
happening. Perhaps they wanted to go too but felt it was not politically right. Perhaps they did not visit their old
home in case it was not there [anymore]. Maybe they were worried about their own reaction if someone else now
lived there. Or perhaps they were not ready yet for the encounter between their memories and the current reality‖
(Bose 58).

Stark Differences between Sides
News over the Green Line spread like wildfire and the surge of people between their
once impassable border was the result of a very human curiosity to see the forbidden space
inhabited by the ‗other‘. Greek and Turkish Cypriots compared sides: Greek Cypriots admired
the landscapes of the unspoiled north, while Turkish Cypriots were amazed by the designer
shopping malls of the much wealthier south. Greek Cypriots flocked to casinos in the North and
Turkish Cypriots traveled to horse races in the South (Bose 59).
In March 2010, two members of the Travellerspoint Travel Community, Jac and Chalky,
visited Cyprus. Although they stayed in the Greek south, which is also known as Lefkosa by the
Turks, they managed to cross the Green Line several times by foot. They explained that in order
to cross the border they had to get stamped from both sides of the border ―which was
administered on pieces of paper by officials in small portable white offices; they described the
territory around the Green Line to be surrounded by ―empty dilapidated buildings that were
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off-limits due to booby traps that still exist inside‖ (―Travellerspoint‖). The traveling couple
reported the stark contrasts of the Greek-Turkish sides noting:
―The Greek half of Nicosia was very modern, and had a high street that resembled many British ones, with Topshop
and McDonalds along the street. Entering the Turkish north however, was like entering a completely new country.
The currency was different (although euros still accepted) but the streets resembled those you'd find in a Middle
Eastern country - less shiny and polished, but more characterful‖ (―Travellerspoint‖)

After spending the night on the Greek side, the couple decided to take a minibus to Kyrenia
(Girne) on the north coast of Turkish Cyprus, only a quick 30-minute drive over the mountain
range, one that had a massive Turkish Cypriot flag painted on its side, overlooking Greek
Nicosia. They admit, ―It almost felt like defiant declaration to the Greeks, reminding them that
the north was the domain of the Turks‖ (―Travellerspoint‖). After arriving in Kyrenia, they
described it as a ―charming small cobbled town, which had beautiful harbour, brimming with
boats, lined with cafés and restaurants, and watched over by the old Girne Castle‖. They also
described the water as very clear and blue and visible to mainland Turkey.
However, beyond the physical distinctions between sides there are also less obvious
mental differences: Most of the Greek Cypriots who crossed the line at its opening were in
search of the past, a life that was lost during the Turkish invasion of 1974 when Greek Cypriots
were forced to abandon their families and homes and become misplaced refugees. Many Greek
Cypriots visited the sites of old villages and homes and many of the Turkish families residing
there welcomed their guests with food and drink. In some instances, Turkish families turned
over old family albums left by the Greek Cypriot families in the rush of pressure from
advancing Turkish military formations. Although, a large portion of Greek Cypriots decided
against the journey in order to spare themselves the emotional pain of a lost past. Turkish
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Cypriots on the other hand, crossed the Green Line in search of a better future. In a matter of
weeks after the Line‘s opening, ―twenty-five thousand Turkish Cypriots took the opportunity to
lodge applications for ―The Republic of Cyprus‖ passports with the Greek Cypriot authorities‖
(Bose 60).
Cyprus Accession to the EU and Opposition to the Annan Plan
Cyprus is an indisputably small state when considering the three most used qualitative
criteria for smallness: The population of the republic is 667,000 with about another 200,000 in
the north (excluding Turkish troops but including Turkish settlers); the 2001 GDP of the
republic totaled 10.2 billion and an estimated 1 billion in the north; the land area of the entire
island totals 9,251 square miles. Yet, despite its small qualitative size, Cyprus has managed to
attract a disproportionate amount of international attention (Nugent 4-5). Cyprus‘s decision to
become an EU member state has been influenced by economic reasons, the power of the EU‘s
emerging influence, as well as its appeal to soft security abilities (Nugent 5). Cyprus is the
second smallest acceding state. According to Neill Nugent, author of Cyprus and the European
Union: The Significance of Being Small, claims ―Cyprus‘s past, current, and future relations with
the EU and the EU‘s relations with it should not be viewed as they often are, too much through
the lens of the ‗Cyprus Problem‘ (concerns over ethnic divisions)‖, Nugent argues that Cyprus‘s
smallness is a large factor in its relations and an overlooked dimension motivating its decision
to seek EU membership (Nugent 19).
Cyprus was admitted into EU along with nine other countries on May 1 2004. The
political roller coaster ride from 2003- 2004 proved: ―The challenge of forging peace turned out
to be more complex and daunting than anticipated, and a lesson in the limitations of
international peace-making intervention in a society deeply scarred and fissured by more than
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four decades of ethnonational conflict‖ (Bose 58). According to author of Ethnic Nationalism and
Adaptation in Cyprus, Neophytos G. Loizides, ―Cyprus accession to the European Union
inadvertently contributed to the strengthening of Greek Cypriotism and the breakdown of
hegemonic beliefs emphasizing cooperation with other parties for the settlement of the Cyprus
problem‖ (Loizides184). However, attempts for settlement took a turn when Greek Cypriot
interests became the dominant political discourse. On April 7, 2004, Cypriot president Tassos
Papadopoulos, released his ―emotional and polemic plea‖ urging Greek Cypriots to say NO to
the Annan Plan (Loizides 184).
The Annan Plan proposed a loosely federal union in Cyprus in which the constituent
territorial units would have maximal autonomy. It also stipulated that, ―limited joint
institutions would operate on the basis of consociational norms‖ (Bose 96). On security issues, it
planned to demilitarize Cyprus. Greek and Turkish military contingents were ordered to limit
their military personnel to six thousand each immediately, with another cut down to threethousand set for 2011. A UN peacekeeping presence was also stationed to continue until at least
2010, and scheduled to be reviewed from then on. The constitutional structure of the Annan
Plan was modeled on Switzerland and ―remarkably similar to the confederal agreement and
consociational Dayton agreement that ended the Bosnian War in 1995 and to the consociational
Northern Ireland agreement reached on Good Friday in April 1998‖ (Bose 100). On April 24,
2004 65 percent of the Turkish population said ―Yes‖ to the Annan Plan, however, 76 Greek
Cypriots said ―No‖.
There are several proximate causes of the Greek Cypriot rejection of the plan: The tide of
negative attitude was partially due to the way the Annan Plan was ―sold‖ to the international
community. Many Greek Cypriots also felt ―railroaded and bullied‖ by pressure from the
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international community claiming that the Annan Plan marked the ―last chance for a
settlement‖ (Bose 101). In addition, one well-known Greek Cypriot academic argued the plan
would, ―establish a divisive and dysfunctional system of governance… [that] legitimizes and
institutionalizes the division of the island‖, claiming that ―its adoption is a worse option than
partition‖, asserting that ―bi-communality should be an integral but not the exclusive
characteristic of the framework for a solution [and] regarding bi-zonality, although initially
there would be two states we should not exclude the possibility… of evolution into a system
that would combine elements of federation and unitary states‖ (Bose 101-102).
Nevertheless, Papadopoulos successfully won the battle of identity by playing up
glorious moments in Greek Cypriot history while demonizing Turkish piracy. He established a
form of Greek Cypriot nationalism ―driven by isolationism and lack of trust of the international
community‖(Loizides 184). In direct contrast the post-referendum elections featured Turkish
leaders such as Ali Talat advertising international diplomacy. Truthfully, Papadopoulos made
great play with Greek Cypriots‘ commemorations of the struggle countering British colonial
power in the 1950s and against the Turkish invasion of 1974. However, rejection of the Annan
plan is ―entrenched in the republic‘s mind because of the need for security and a fear of all
political risk, as well as a perception of Turkish Cypriots as competitors rather than as partners
in the shared wellbeing of a re-unified island‖ (LMD, Kadritzke).
The Annan Plan, however you spin it, was an EU-brokered deal that overwhelming
favored the Greek Cypriots. How so? Greece was promised EU membership regardless of how
it voted, while Turkish Cyprus was offered admission only if both Turks and Greeks approved
the deal. Therefore, since Greeks would pay no penalty for rejecting the plan they had every
incentive to hold out for an even better deal. Nevertheless, the decision to admit Greek Cyprus
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regardless not only spoiled the peace deal, it destroyed the credibility of the EU promises
because it handed Greek Cyprus the upper hand to veto the promised moves to ease the
Turkish half‘s economic isolation. Finally, it affectively killed EU-NATO cooperation because
NATO member Turkey refuses to recognize EU member Cyprus until the Cyprus Question is
resolved, and therefore veto‘s all cooperative initiatives on their end.
European Court of Human Rights Decisions in Cyprus
Since 1974 the southern Cyprus has been under the control of the government of the
Republic of Cyprus, while the northern part, administered by Turkish Cypriots, proclaimed
itself the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC") in 1983. The United States does not
recognize the "TRNC," nor does any country other than Turkey. To this day, a substantial
number, 35% of Turkish troops remain on the island. In a number of cases the European Court
of Human Rights has found Turkey responsible for continuous human rights violations since
the 1974 Turkish invasion. According to a 2010 Human Rights Report on Cyprus conducted by
the US Department of State human rights violations involve:
―Reports of police abuse and degrading treatment of persons in custody and asylum seekers. Violence against
women, including spousal abuse, and several incidents of violence against children were reported. There were
instances of discrimination and violence against members of minority ethnic and national groups. Trafficking of
women to the island, particularly for sexual exploitation, continued to be a problem, and labor trafficking was also
reported‖ (US Department of State).

On July 22, 1989, Titina Loizidou, a Cypriot citizen, lodged an application with the
European Commission of Human Rights to return her property in Kyrenia in northern Cyprus,
where she owned certain plots of land. Since 1974, she had been prevented from gaining access
to the above-mentioned properties as a result of the presence of Turkish forces. The application
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resulted in three judgments by the European Court of Human Rights, each held Turkey
responsible for human rights violations in the northern part of Cyprus. Although the Court
expressed that the damages awarded were not compensation for the property, but only for the
denial of the ownership and use of the property, for the fact that Titina Loizidou continues to
retain full legal ownership of her property. In 2003 Turkey paid Loizidou the compensation
amounts, an estimated 1 million, ruled by the European Court of Human Rights. In addition,
Turkey evacuated her house for her to return, however, Loizidou has chosen not to return,
claiming that Turkish occupation troops threaten her return. The Court accepted her claim.
Turkey will continue to pay compensation to her for denying the right to her property.
The Mystery of Affinity and a Culture of Contentment
Over the course of the past three decades, the idea of enosis has almost disappeared
from Greek discourse and apparently Athens‘ endorsement of the Annan plan made no
difference to Greek Cypriot outlook. At its core the same ideas still remain: That Cyprus is and
has historically been a Greek island, and as the majority, Greek Cypriots should have a
dominant not just an equal say in political determination. Ultimately, the provisions of the
Annan Plan go against these deeply held beliefs. In the characteristic Greek Cypriot opinion:
―they have never had their day in court‖ and this powerful widespread sense of grievance was
vented in 2004 (Bose 103). The southern two-thirds of Cyprus is a successful society. The Greek
Cypriot side of Nicosia resembles a wealthy town in Florida. Although the Annan Plan
promised them the return of their ancient villages, many now seem to ―prefer to live in a
smaller, richer, safer, nearly all-Greek state than shoot the rapids in untrustworthy company on
a raft engineered by Annan‘s team‖ (Bose 103). Furthermore, Greek Cypriots understood that
they would be joining the EU regardless of a settlement, therefore, ―they had no counterveiling
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incentive to support the Annan Plan that might just have outweighed their dominant
underlying belief structure and their cultures of grievance and contentment‖ (Bose 103).
In April 2005, two years after opening the Green Line one year after the rejection of the
Annan Plan, an era in Turkish politics comes to an end after Rauf Denktash leaves the scene. At
the same time, Turkish Cypriots remain diplomatically and economically isolated. Two months
later, in June 2005, UN undersecretary general for political affairs, Kieran Prendergast, toured
Cyprus and met with the island‘s principal leaders but concluded that Cyprus was not ready to
recommence its third-party diplomacy. The Cyprus Question has yet to be answered. It is likely
that settlement will be within the ill-fated UN arrangement. Until then, ―the island remains
uneasily suspended between an elusive formula of unification and the sword of partition‖ (Bose
104).
Cultivating Unity without the Annan Plan
While the Annan Plan strove to make everyone a winner, offering a state within a
federation with good prospects for economic development, promising fled Greek compatriots
indemnity payments to their lost land, and insuring the EU will continue its role in supporting
peaceful development. Under the Annan Plan, Cyprus would become a federation of two
constituent states—a Greek Cypriot State and a Turkish Cypriot State joined together by a
single federal apparatus. The government would be based on a collective presidential council
and bicameral legislature as well as a Supreme Court. Of course, as already mentioned there
would also be a limited right to return between territories of the two communities. And lastly,
the Annan Plan would allow both Greece and Turkey to maintain a permanent military
presence on the island.
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The problem with the Annan Plan is ethnic. The problem with Cyprus is also ethnic.
Chapter 2 established that the Compromise of 1960—the ―solution‖ of creating a bi-ethnic state
did not actually solve anything at all. In fact, the compromise created an even more divided
population than ever. It only took three years for this cacophonous and awkward arrangement
to collapse. In the meantime, the remains of the 1960 Compromise inclined ethnic tensions and
fumed animosities all the way up to the climax in 1974.
The Annan plan is just another example of bi-ethnic asymmetrical compromise,
featuring a constitution based on protecting the major interests and expectations of each of the
contending parties through a bi-communal form of government. Within this bi-communal
government, the two communities would be arranged to be separated educationally, culturally,
and religiously. Within the legal system, Greeks will be judged by Greek judges and Turks by
Turk judges. The president of the Republic of Cyprus would always be a Greek (who will be
elected separately by the Greek community) and the vice president will always be a Turk
(elected separately by the Turkish community). In addition, the executive and legislative
branches will be required to fill a system of ethnic quotas.
The point and case here is that nothing changes, if nothing changes. Cyprus is has
established itself as an independent nation, therefore there is no need to maintain foreign
military presence on the island because the threat of force will only lead each side to counterbalance each other. Fact: Greece has never owned Cyprus. Fact: The Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus does not exist to anyone outside of the minds of the Turks. In addition,
maintaining a bi-ethnic and bi-communal form of government only reinforces the radical
appropriation and application of ―otherness‖ within the practical domain. Dichotomizing
human from human on an ethnic basis merely breeds intolerance in which both sides are likely
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to deny any common cultural ground between groups so that no other group can refute the
other. These ‗primordial‘ claims are highly corrosive to political integration, because these
claims legitimize a system of unimpeachable values and truths. Therefore, if we eliminate the
option of domination of either side and we know that compromise in bi-communal terms has
failed every time, then based on the simple model process of elimination, the last option left is
integration.
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Turkish Cypriot flag painted on the side of a Turkish Cypriot mountain range overlooking Greek Nicosia. The flag
represents a defiant declaration to the Greeks as a constant reminder that the northern third is now the domain of the
Turks. Turkish Cypriots refer to the north as Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus –a state not recognized by any
country in the world, except Turkey.

The word ‗Enosis‘ carved on the side of a Greek Cypriot mountain
facing the Turkish north.
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Chapter 4: Reconciling Differences in Ethnic Political Conflict
Culture is not a biologically transmitted complex – Ruth Benedict
I am not Athenian or a Greek, but a citizen of the world – Socrates
Ethnic Affinity is Diverse in Type
At the heart of the matter lies the mystery of affinity, the sense of belonging whether to a
nation or to a people. The legal definition of French or Spanish citizenship is based on the
legalities featuring only recognition of a pre-existing state of mind which is affective,
sentimental, and often subconscious; this is also the way ethnic feelings exist. Another
noteworthy example of ethnic affinity is provided by the Greeks. At the Versailles Conference
in 1919 Venizelos explained: ―A Greek is someone who speaks Greek, thinks Greek and feels
Greek‖. But what binds Greeks? Laurence Halley claims, ―The modern Greek identifies strongly
with the builders of the Parthenon, the founders of modern European thought, the organizers of
the original Olympic Games. There, he believes are his roots but in fact he is of remarkably
heterogeneous origin: Vlach, Macedonian, Slav, even Albanian (Halley 95). Ethnic identity is
diverse in type, less uniform and generally a lower order of intensity. It has the ability to
transcend frontiers because it implies no commitment to a common shared territory.
Culture and History = Knowledge
Culture and history are not just something created by people but that they are, to a
certain extent, that which creates persons. Maurice Bloch, author of How They Think We Think,
discusses the anthropological approaches to cognition, memory, and literacy. He examines
internal and external memory and how they affect people‘s views of themselves in history and
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how this in turn shapes their character. He reverts back to two familiar philosophers and their
folk theories of memory: Plato and Aristotle. Above all, Plato was concerned with ―forms‖—
what he regarded as absolute transcendental truth. He believed humans, because they were
humans, know everything of significance at birth. Unfortunately, they will forget their original
knowledge, but through time and experience they will regain this lost knowledge. Therefore,
humans may think they are learning but what they are actually doing is remembering and
recalling what they already knew. Plato believed in the concept of absolute truth and he felt that
it was innate in the original human condition. Aristotle, on the other hand, supposed that
humans were created by the things they learned; the mind was shaped and matured through
the process, compilation, and application of new and old knowledge. For him, the mind was
like wax that would become permanently imprinted with new information and represented
through the mind‘s capacity retain and expand knowledge. According to Aristotle, when a
person is trying to remember, they are merely searching for an imprint of past information that
could unfortunately be overlaid by more recent memories and information, thus making older
data difficult to access (Bloch 70).
The Platonist perceives particular events as overall insignificant. The human duty is to
retain human identity and protect their inherent transcendental knowledge from being lost
through the injuries of events. Conversely, the Aristotelian is in a permanent transformational
dialectic with the world. Practical wisdom is not something absolute or finite at all but rather
something continually being renegotiated; this process is inevitable, however, human
experiences and learnt information will leave permanent imprints on the brain. These
alternative speculations of memory are both inseparably linked to differing concepts of human
nature, cosmos, and morality. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, modern psychologists and
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anthropologists understand that knowledge is a complex mixture of both implicit as well as
explicit knowledge (Bloch 71).
Humans tell stories about the world to help them make sense of things. The world is in
turn, shaped by the narrative characteristics of these stories. There is nothing beyond the reality
created in the narratives since any other past or present is simply invisible. According to
Maurice Bloch,
―If people act within their own history, constructed within their own narratives, any other history is irrelevant to
their action, and who are we, professional historians and anthropologists, to understand their actions and their past
in any other way than in the terms of their narratives. In doing so we are merely our types of narratives for theirs and
in this way carrying out some kind of intellectual imperialism‖ (Bloch 101).

Narratives are used to present a certain representation of the world which must be
known in a way neither constructed nor transparently or completely reflected by narratives.
Narratives talk in different ways about what is known; they are not knowledge itself (Bloch
110).
The Intensely Dynamic Political Quality of Ethnicity
Throughout the past decade the international system has experienced several
fundamental realignments. The most obvious change has been the diminishing role of the
nation-state and transnational actors. Although ethnic groups have become increasingly
involved within the realm of international affairs, their role in international politics has received
only periodic attention. Based on the correlation between ethno-conflict and international
instability in several regional subsystems we notice the intensely dynamic political quality of
ethnicity. According to Rupert Emerson and Walker Conner,
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―Ethnicity is intimately related to the evolution of the nineteenth and twentieth-century state systems through the
force of nationalism. It is the idea of modern nationalism that predicts the most intensely politicized dynamics of
ethnic affiliations with its emphasis on ―we‖ and ―they‖. Nationalism identifies a primary political and territorial
community – the state with a common ethnic identity – the nation‖ (Stack 4).

In other words, nationalism furnaces a real or imagined sense of peoplehood or belonging that
is founded on a common history, ancestry, culture, language, or region. Nationalism, therefore,
is the ―most visible and politicized manifestation of the phenomenon we call ethnicity‖ (Stack
4).
In the post-World War II era, ethnic groups were provided an unprecedented number of
opportunities to enter the global system after the rise of global interdependence in: economic
relations, communication systems, and transportation mechanisms. Globalization has been
defined by multiple channels of political intercourse as well as a constantly shifting hierarchy of
issues. Furthermore, world politics has been also complicated by inequalities regarding
resource distribution, quality of life, technology, as well as industrial and economic growth.
Ethnic Groups as Emerging Transnational Actors
The basis of identity provides group members with a distinctive view of the world
reinforced by racial, religious, linguistic, and cultural differences. Ethnicity then, is a subjective
identity used to distinguish between group members and outsiders. Around the world, ethnic
identity has proven to be an effective vehicle towards group mobilization. When confronting
increasingly bureaucratic industrial societies, ethnic groups use utilitarian interests as a means
for expressing group advantage – power, status, and wealth- within the political system. In
many advanced industrialized societies ethnic groups have managed to become critical social
and political players (Stack 17-19).
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On an intrasocietal level, ethnic groups are reflections of an evolving transnational
system. The world resurgence of ethnicity is seemingly tied to the environment in two ways: 1)
through the politicization of global communication and transportation networks and 2) through
accelerating patterns in political and cultural fragmentation. Thanks to remarkable
technological advancements, contemporary world politics has increased the range and
concentration of intergroup contacts as well as transnational linkages. Greater opportunities for
transnational interaction equal greater global penetration in domestic world politics. Walker
Conner suggests, ―There is an inbuilt accelerator in the technological advances and other forces
that causes a continuous ‗shrinking of world‘ and the shrinking of states as presently defined.
The frequency and pervasiveness of intergroup contacts appear fated to increase exponentially,
regardless of the planner‖ (Stack 21). The sophistication of the global mass media serves as an
effective tool for mobilization as well as survival. The television aids the process of rapid
ideological and political conversion through the method of psychological immigration- a system in
which artificial images and self-perceptions replace more traditional components of ethnicity
(Stack 22). Ethnicity‘s significance in world affairs can be credited to the politicization of
transnational communication and transportation networks. Since WWII trends towards global
homogenization have been accelerating. Homogenized ethnic groups tend to focus on
recognizing similarities as well as differences among collectivities. Unfortunately, conflict is the
likely result of this mentality. In Idols of the Tribe, Isaacs explains:
―This fragmentation of human society is a pervasive fact in human affairs and has always been. It persists and
increases in our own time as part of an ironic, painful, and dangerous paradox: the more global our science and
technology, the more tribal our politics; the more universal our system of communication, the less we know what to
communicate; the closer we get to other planets, the less able we become to lead a tolerable existence on our own; the
more it becomes apparent that human beings cannot decently survive with their separateness, the more separate they
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become. In the face of an ever more urgent need to pool the world‘s resources and its powers, human society is
spitting off into smaller and smaller fragments‖ (Stack 24).

The Adaptive Nature of Ethnicity
Ethnic identity is considered to be a self-concept rather than something assumed to be
fixed or certain. They are fluid, socially constructed concepts established through territorial
boundaries and group formation. Ho-Won Jeong explains, ―Particular claims for group rights
and privileges are inherent in identity politics; given their contingent and adaptive nature,
identities can be reinvented and reconstructed‖ (Byrne and Irvin 121). In the end, ethnic
identifications are internally and externally constructed and formed in relation to the outside
world.
How Can Anthropology Help?
Anthropology addresses deep ontological questions: Where did we come from? What is
our nature? Why do we behave the way we do? What are the prospects for our future? What
does it mean to be human? The word, anthropology, literally translates to the study of
humankind. Anthropology is based on a macroscopic perspective that focuses on
understanding the pasts of specific cultures and observing the reoccurring patterns that affect
the present. It is a study that embraces both the biosocial diversity as well as the uniformity of
humanity (Fry xiii).
It is a natural human tendency to think in terms of the present ―here and now‖.
However, many of the challenges of humanity in the 21st century demand a broader
perspective. Much of the violence observed in ethnic political conflict today stems from people
defending their rights or attempting to correct injustices. Anthropological and historical cases
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demonstrate that violent means of justice seeking can be replaced by effective nonviolent
approaches: This is the key for creating and maintaining peace. Anthropology contributes to the
understanding of war and peace by challenging conventional ways of thinking about war,
peace, security, and injustice – all concerns for everyone living on this interdependent planet,
where we all breathe the same air and share the same threat of death through a nuclear winter
(Fry xv). According to cultural anthropologist Ruth Benedict, the purpose of anthropology is to
make the world safe for human differences. She explains, ―No man ever looks at the world with
pristine eyes, he sees it edited by a definite set of customs, institutions, and ways of thinking‖
(BrainyQuote).
Peace Building in Identity Driven Conflicts
The inherent awareness of a distinctive national identity accompanied by a perception of
the incompatibility of interests fashions the growth of nationalistic manifestations. Peace
building in identity driven conflicts is a matter of negotiating social values through a large
social network. Ho-Won Jeong, explains how ethnic groups can remain passive and
immobilized for a long period of time; Interestingly, ―Owing to the combined phenomena of
rising expectations and relative deprivation, a sense of entitlement rises faster than is fulfilled
for ethnic groups‖ (Byrne and Irvin 115). Basically, mobilization in one community will
commonly activate counter-mobilization by others. Ethnic groups who claim cultural rights and
status are a perceived threat to the expectations and interests of neighboring communities. The
management of ethno-political conflict revolves around defining the ethnic agenda.
Negotiation, compromise, and accommodation are keys to peaceful coexistence; however, they
are the ―results of hard bargaining though political processes that may not eliminate conflict but
prevent the competition from erupting into destructive violence‖ (Byrne and Irvin 116).
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Typically, ethno-conflict is far too complex to be resolved rationally. Commitment to a nation is
not equally matched with loyalty to the state. A forced attempt for national integration will
most likely result in ethnocide, as was the case when several post-colonial states made an effort
to coercively assimilate a poly-ethnic civilization into a territorial nation state system.
According to the neoliberal political model political, development derives from a strong central
government capable of reshaping ethnic loyalties, individual identity, and group structure. The
territorial concept of nationality is founded on the establishment of modern, bureaucratic,
centralized states. The state is responsible of resolving ethnic conflict in a neoliberal model of
peace building. The neoliberal model is based on a pluralistic political system in which people
are granted civil rights and conflict is controlled through the expansion of economic resources.
State institutions aspire to create a single political culture in which ethnic differences are traded
for a single civic identity and ethnic values are the replaced by needs and aspirations that can be
managed by the state. The creation of a national political center, such as democracy, is a means
to transform identity through the promotion of civic identity. However, the ambitions of the
state are much easier said than done (Byrne and Irvin 117-118). The idea that plainly
differentiated positions can be compromised through the establishment of a single constitution
is not an easy mission when multicultural issues are not confronted with particularism and
alternatively swept under the rug. Ethnic politics in late modern conditions have become
considerably more alienated and marginalized. In many societies, the state is an instrument of
supremacy by privileged ethnic groups who participate in a form of cultural despotism (Byrne
and Irvin 119).
Are Conflict and Aggression Synonymous?
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American anthropologist, Douglas P. Fry, defines conflict as ―a perceived divergence of
interests – where in – interests are broadly conceptualized to include values, needs, goals, and
wishes – between two or more parties, often accompanied by feelings of anger or hostility‖ (Fry
11). He defines aggression as ―the infliction of harm, pain, or injury on other individuals (verbal
or physical)‖, however his point is that conflict need not involve and aggression whatsoever.
Conflict and aggression are not synonymous. He claims that, ―Although violence may be one of
the most noticeable and destructive ways of dealing through which people handle conflict, a
close examination of cross-cultural data reveals that people usually deal with conflicts without
violence‖ (Fry 11). In his book, The Human Potential for Peace: an Anthropological Challenge to
Assumptions about War and Violence, he addresses five major approaches to conflict management.
Unilateral and bilateral approaches include:
1) Avoidance – disputants cease to interact or limit their interaction either temporarily or permanently.
2) Toleration – the issue in dispute is ignored as the relationship is simply continued.
3) Negotiation – disputants interact to form mutually acceptable compromises or solutions. Negotiation often
involves the giving and accepting of compensation.
4) Self-redress – (a.k.a. self-help and coercion) one disputant takes unilateral action in an attempt to prevail in a
dispute or to punish another.
5) Settlement – (the trilateral approach) third party deals with a dispute. Settlement can take several forms: friendly
peacemaking – third party simply separates or distracts disputants; mediation – third party facilitates negotiation
process; arbitration – third party renders a decision, but lacks the power to enforce it; adjudication – third party
renders a decision and has the power to enforce it; repressive peacemaking – third party uses force or threat to stifle a
dispute (Fry 23).
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Certainly violence part of the human profile, but it is only a small part. A balanced view of
human nature recognizes the immense human capacity for limiting and dealing with conflict
without reverting to force.
The Geopolitics of Emotion
In 1993, political scientist Samuel Huntington was praised for his book, The Clash of
Civilizations, which predicted that the fundamental source of conflict in the post-Cold War
world would not be ideological or economic but cultural. Dominique Moisi, a leading authority
on international affairs, claims that our post 9/11 world has is divided by more than cultural
fault lines. Moisi depicts geopolitics today as a ―clash of emotions‖, focusing on how cultures of
fear, humiliation, and hope are reshaping the world.
Historically, geopolitics have been based on rational, objective data concerning territory,
economic resources, hard-line military power, and the overall cold political calculus of interest.
By contrast, emotions have been considered essentially subjective, if not entirely irrational.
Moisi bases his book, The Geopolitics of Emotion, on a dual conviction: 1) One cannot fully
understand the world in which we live without trying to integrate and understand its emotions.
2) Emotions are like cholesterol, both good and bad. The difficulty is to find the right balance
between them (Moisi x). Moisi claims, ―Fear against hope, hope against humiliation,
humiliation leading to sheer irrationality and even sometimes, to violence – one cannot
comprehend the world in which we live without examining the emotions that help to shape it‖
(Moisi xi).
Do emotions represent cultural tendencies of particular regions and populations today?
Do these varying emotions influence the political, social, and cultural conflicts in our world
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today? There was a time when international affairs scholars tactfully discounted the importance
of emotions. Global politics was reserved for a special caste of elite professionals, who treated
the world like a game of chess. States and governments were expected to act rationally.
Emotions were therefore contained because they were predicted to add additional irrationality
to an already disordered world. But of course, emotions are not easily contained. They always
surface, or burst, with a vengeance. Moisi says,
―Today we shall see, quests for identity by peoples uncertain of who they are, their place in the world, and their
prospects for a meaningful future have replaced ideology as the motor of history, with the consequence that
emotions matter more in a world where media are playing the role of a sounding board and a magnifying glass‖
(Moisi 4).

Whether they are religious, ideological, national, or purely personal, emotions have always
mattered. It is impossible to understand the course of history by failing to account for the
crucial influence of emotions.
In his book, Moisi focuses on three primary emotions: fear, hope, and humiliation. All
three emotions are linked closely with the notion of confidence, which he believes is the
defining factor in how nations and people handle challenges and communicate with one
another. Moisi explains,
―Fear is the absence of confidence. If your life is dominated by fear, you are apprehensive about the present and
expect the future to become ever more dangerous. Hope, by contrast, is an expression of confidence; it is based on the
conviction that today is better than yesterday and that tomorrow will be better than today. And humiliation is the
injured confidence of those who have lost hope in the future; your lack of hope is the fault of others, who have
treated you badly in the past. When the contrast between your idealized and glorious past and your frustrating
present is too great, humiliation prevails (Moisi 5).
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Therefore, confidence is a major factor in determining world health and it is just as
important on a national scale as it is on an individual level. Confidence can be mapped through
a series of indicators which scientifically measure the degree of trust of a population in its own
future through spending patterns, levels of investment, birthrates, even architecture, art or
music (Moisi 6).
In the age of globalization, emotions have become indispensible to the comprehensibility
of our increasingly complex world. Moisi explicates, ―Identity is strongly linked with
confidence, or lack thereof, and expressed though emotions – in particular those of fear, hope,
and humiliation‖ (Moisi 13). Whereas the ideological atmosphere of the twentieth century was
defined in terms of conflicting political models: capitalism, fascism, and socialism. Today,
ideological conflicts focus on the struggle for identity; it is important to assert one‘s own
individuality in a globalized world where everyone and everything are so interconnected. Moisi
notes, ―In a world dominated by identity, we are less defined by our political beliefs and ideas
than by our perception of essence, by the confidence we gain from our achievements and the
respect we receive from others or by the lack thereof‖ (Moisi 14). Emotions are reciprocal – they
are the image in the mirror and the eye of the person who beholds that image. Whether you fear
someone, feel humiliated by someone, or hope to be like someone, emotions are mutually
dependent and critical to understanding our identity dominated world. Moisi says,
―An element of fear is necessary for survival, and hope ignites and fuels the motor of life. Even humiliation in very
small doses can stimulate one to do better… But deliberate humiliation without hope is destructive, and too much
fear, too much humiliation, and not enough hope constitute the most dangerous of all possible social combinations,
the one that leads to the greatest instability and tension (Moisi 15).
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According to the present, governing scientific mood of academic circles, emotion is
inherently too ―soft‖, subjective, and indefinable, to hold any real meaning or value. This
attitude is understandable. The increasing complexity of the world today drives the inclination
to analyze the international system through the distanced prism of a scientific or
pseudoscientific approach. In many of the world‘s most prestigious universities, quantitative
analysis theories are applied to international relations, but big questions regarding human
behavior are ignored. Even on the most basic level, the ―soft‖, subjective realities of emotion
matter.
Human Capabilities
Martha C. Nussbaum has paid a great deal of consideration to the aspects and
implications of culture and social development. Ultimately, she feels that culture has developed
an affinity with local members and an unbridgeable alien ‗otherness‘ with members outside this
realm. Instead of focusing on what makes us different from others, we must recognize that we
all share inherently the same human aspects. Nussbaum set forth to reveal ‗the central human
capabilities‘: How human life can be defined based on shared interests and practices. ―We
recognize other humans as human across many differences of time and place, of custom and
appearance‖ (Nussbaum and Glover 73).What do we consider as characteristic of human life?
Nussbaum names eleven universal dimensions we all share on a biological level:
1) Mortality – all human beings share aversion to death.
2) Human body – the experience of the body and the importance we ascribe to its various functions may be culturally
shaped. Yet the body itself is not culturally variant physical requirements such as hunger, thirst, the need for
protection/shelter, sexual desire, and mobility.
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3) Capacity for pleasure and pain – humans are sentient beings subject to both experiences. Interestingly, the aversion
to pain as a fundamental evil is a primitive end and it appears to be an unlearned part of being a human animal.
4) Cognitive capability: perceiving, imagining, thinking – humans all have the ability for sense perception, to make
their own distinctions, think, imagine, and attempt to understand.
5) Early infant development – humans all began as helpless babies who experience extreme dependency, need, and
affection.
6) Practical reason – all humans share the capacity to participate in the planning and management of their own lives,
and the ability to draw their own conclusions based on what they know.
7) Affiliation with other human beings – humans live in relation to others and define themselves in terms of the ties
they make and keep.
8) Relatedness to other species and to nature – universal understanding that humans are not the only living things
occupying Earth and in turn, are aware that there is a ‗complex interlocking order that both supports and limits
them‘.
9) Humor and play – human life to some extent always makes room for recreation and laughter. Lack of it is taken as
a sign of deep disturbance.
10) Separateness – each human is ‗one in number‘, proceeding down a different path that continues from birth to
death. Each person is subject to only their unique sentiments and experiences. In addition, ‗each person dies without
logically entailing the death of anyone else‘. Even the most intense acts of human interaction (sexual experience)
never result in fusion‘.
11) Strong separateness –realization of the individual nature of life developed through self-identification (Nussbaum
and Glover 76-80).

Beyond the biological level of the conceptual human being, Nussbaum claims that
humans share functional capabilities as well such as: the preservation of life; the opportunity to
have good health; the ability to avoid unnecessary and non-beneficial pain; the capability of
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utilizing imaginative and cognitive senses; attachment to people and things outside of self;
Conception of well-being and self-interest and critical reflection in planning one‘s own life;
desire to laugh, play, and enjoy life; ability to recognize and show concern for human beings
through various forms of social interaction; as well as the capacity to live with and care for
animals, plants, and the natural world; ability of living one‘s own life and no one else‘s. With
the guarantee of non-interference with certain choices that are personal and definitive of selfhood (Nussbaum and Glover 83-85).
Cultural Complexity, Moral Interdependence, and the Global Dialogical Community
International problems such as ethnic political conflict require worldwide
communication and effort in order to reach an effective solution. According to Seyla Benhabib,
―Among the most disheartening intellectual developments of the last two decades is the irony that the world has
grown together and the globe become unified to a hitherto unprecedented degree, our theoretical discourse has
turned local, contextualist, parochial, and has shied away from thinking globally and reflecting about principals of
planetary interdependence‖ (Nussbaum and Glover 235).

Benhabib regards cultural relativism as a ‗poor man‘s sociology‘. She claims that supporters of
cultural relativism defend their beliefs based on the assumption that the ‗reflexivity of cultures
and the drive towards legitimation‘ are invasive ‗western elements‘ and the western
epistemologist must rather assume the position and attitude of the bemused, detached observer
with the mentality of ‗we do not need to scratch where it does not itch‘. For Richard Rorty, the
concept of self-understanding is illusory. He feels that questioning the norms and values of
one‘s own culture is critical in grasping the bigger picture: There is something larger than the
community and culture that represents the individual – humanity which has intrinsic nature
(Nussbaum and Glover 242). Since the Enlightenment, people have been torn between
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allegiance to one‘s own context and moral ideas humanity and international solidarity.
According to Benhabib, many cultures have been moved by a belief in the human community
that at in some circumstances felt closer to them than their own local community. She explains,
―Most of us today are members of more than ‗one‘ community, one linguistic group, one
ethnos. Millions of people the world over engage in migrations, whether economic, political, or
artistic. Every Western nation state in Europe is currently dealing with multi-cultural and multinational pressures (Nussbaum and Glover 243).
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Conclusion: Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?
You can’t say the fence is not intrusive – Robert Gross
We may have all come in on different ships, but we’re in the same boat now – Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr.
Using Barriers to Deal with Conflict
The term interface barrier or ‗peaceline‘ generally refers to barriers that have been built
in response to concerns for safety and security in the interface area (Jarman 22). Barriers are
erected as a means of controlling and restricting the association of people in an effort to
improve levels of security and safety. According to conflict researcher, Neil Jarman:
―Barriers have increasingly been seen as a way of controlling movement in many parts
of the world. These include barriers that have been built between countries and within cities,
with the aim of controlling immigration, reducing crime or violence, increasing a sense of
security, and also to restrict movement and exclude the unwanted…beyond making a symbolic
statement, and in many cases, the barriers have become a target of violence, as they often serve
to indicate the presence of a hostile, unwanted or unseen ‗other‘ on the other side‖ (Jarman 24).
Perhaps the most famous wall of modern times: the Berlin Wall was used to divide
sections of the city. In 1989 the wall was extensively celebrated as it was breached as part of the
collapse of the Soviet Union. In a similar fashion, the ―Green Line‖ was established in Cyprus
following the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern half of the island in 1974. The
Green Line was used to divide the capital city of Nicosia into its Greek and Turkish sectors. The
decision to open the main Ledra Street crossing has been regarded as one step in the right
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direction towards reunification of the island. Despite the widespread criticism of the use of
walls since the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, barrier construction used to ‗solve‘ social
problems has been on the rise (Jarman 25). The two most high profile controversial walls
currently under construction include the US-Mexican border and the Israeli government
structure being erected around the West Bank to restrict the movement of the Palestinians.
Lesser known barriers exist in many other locations. Some include borders between Saudi
Arabia and Yemen, Morocco and Algeria, and between the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and
Melilla and Morocco (Jarman 25). Nevertheless, all attempts to build barriers that segregate
along racial and ethnic lines have regularly attested to be contentious and provocative. Jarman
explains:
―In general constructing a barrier is a way of marking intent. It acknowledges a problem
and indicates some desire to respond to it, albeit in a limited and conservative manner. While
physical structures may provide some short term palliative to a social or political problem, they
also provide a challenge to human ingenuity and persistence. Thus in the long term the
problems will have to be addressed by other means, through debate, dialogue, negotiation, and
some form of political process. Unfortunately once they are erected barriers tend to be
enveloped by a sense of inertia and caution and they are difficult to get rid of‖ (Jarman 26).
In a recent study, Jarman explores people‘s attitudes towards the possible removal of
interface barriers in Belfast. One series of questions explored people‘s understanding of walls
and the purpose they served: 51% felt they were to ‗stop the fighting, trouble, etc., 15% felt they
were there to ‗stop rioting‘, 39% believed they were erected to ‗keep the two sides
apart/segregation‘, and 10% felt they were around to provide a sense of protection, while only
2% believed they were not needed and should have never been put up (Jarman 28). The survey
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also studied people‘s attitudes towards the possible removal of walls. Overall, residents were
willing to see the walls removed, but not necessarily immediately. Most people believed that
they walls did serve some purpose in reducing acts of violence, most agreed that they violence
would not result in anything more than minor or occasional acts of violence, there was also
limited confidence in the ability of the police force to preserve peace without physical barriers
as a last resort. Interestingly, people also noted that while walls provided some security, they
also managed to uphold tensions and antipathy between communities. In addition, people felt
that local politicians ―used the walls to play on people‘s fears‖, Jarman explains, ―A majority
felt that the politicians should do more to create the conditions for the walls to come down, and
the removal of barriers would also lead to an improvement in community relations‖ (Jarman
30). Jarman‘s research on the perception of barriers in Belfast, ―although limited in scope‖,
usefully identifies people‘s concerns and also highlights possible ways to advance the debate.
Key factors would include: more positive efforts from politicians, more diverse and effective
regeneration of interface areas and more cross-community dialogue (Jarman 31).
While the barrier might well provide some sense of security and safety to the residents
of Cyprus it also reinforces, quite obvious, ongoing divisions and territoriality that continues on
the island. Therefore, barriers endure as a ―reminder of how far we still have to go in the
process of establishing a ‗normal‘ society‖, thus Jarman expounds: the sooner residents of
interface communities begin engaging in dialogue and discussion to identify how, when, and in
what circumstances the barriers can finally start to be removed.
The ‘Cyprus Question’
The tiny island of Cyprus is located in a region characterized by fierce nationalism
where ethnic identity plays an important part in day-to-day politics and has even become
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politically institutionalized through different systems on germane national or regional levels.
The case of the Cyprus Question is a prime example of how ethnic groups have made cultural
claims to cite ancestral homogeneity. At the heart of the Cyprus Question lies the mystery of
affinity. Of all the emotionally charged episodes of ethnic conflict that have plagued the
twentieth century, Cyprus was chosen as the case study of this work because it addressed the
primary theoretical issues the world has witnessed in ethnic political conflict today; Issues of
memory, self-definition accompanied by conception of other, nationalism, as well the use of
ethnic claims, grounded in the myth of common ancestry, as political weapons to legitimize as
communicate demands.
As a species of collectivity, the ethnic group manages to lucratively combine symbolic as
well as instrumental reasoning to clothe practical interests and rivalries in the garb of antiquity,
authenticity, and kinship—not to say that it is a lie, only a translation. Most ethnic groups
define and characterize themselves based on a real or supposed common history. The myth of
common history is often a remote or improvable history as we see in the case of Cyprus. The
struggle on Cyprus between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots didn‘t begin until
nationalism reared its ugly head subsequently after the Greek War for Independence. Prior to
that there would have been no ‗Greater Greece‘ for Cyprus to unite with. The notion of a
‗Greater Greece‘ stems from the fact that Cyprus has been subjected to a history of conquest and
foreign rule by whatever power controlled the seaway at the time. With no glorious history of
their own the Greek Cypriots wished to unite with Greece through the process of enosis so that
they too could have access to the same historical symbols and celebrated culture. What the
struggle for enosis generated much fervor and vehemence among Greek Cypriots because for
them it represented an identity crisis. Union with Greece was their attempt to seek, assemble,
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protect, and advance their identities. When their efforts for enosis failed, Greek Cypriots
pushed for independence from Britain instead. While, Cyprus managed to gain its
independence, the outcome was far from liberating. Given the ethnic tensions on the island, the
UN produced the Compromise of 1960, a bi-ethnic compromise that featured a plan for a bicommunal form of government under one federal apparatus. The ―Compromise‖
acknowledged the two groups almost independently of each other; this both intensified
competition as well as eliminate almost all incentive to work together. Eventually, tensions on
the island came to a boil and in 1974, Turkey in fear for her Turkish Cypriot minority on the
island, decided to invade Cyprus, murdering, displacing, and pushing Greek Cypriots to the
southern half of the island where they have resided since. In an effort to improve levels of
security and safety, an interface barrier was installed that UN officials refer to as The Green
Line. However, almost forty years later the Green Line still stands. While measures were taken
in 2003 to open crossing points, the wall still serves as a physical reinforcer of ethnic differences
on the island.
Is There an Answer to the ‘Cyprus Question’
While many historians try to find out what happened, most anthropologists would
rather concentrate on showing the ways in which historical accounts are used as tools in the
contemporary creation of identities in politics and stressing the importance of history not as a
product of the past but as a response of the requirements of the present. Ethno-political conflict
revolves around defining the ethnic agenda. Negotiation, accommodation, and cooperation are
keys to peaceful coexistence; however, they are the results of hard bargaining that can‘t
eliminate conflict but will certainly keep it under control.
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The answer to the Cyprus Question does not lie in a consociational compromise or bicommunal form of government. The point and case here is that nothing changes, if nothing
changes. If insanity means doing the same thing over again and expecting different results, then
Western leaders must be certifiably insane. Just as the bi-ethnic Compromise of 1960 led to the
widened crisis of the 1974 Turkish invasion, another identical ‗solution‘ such as the Annan Plan
would also lead to increased tensions as they have in the past.
In addition, Cyprus is has established itself as an independent nation, therefore there is
no need to maintain foreign military presence on the island because the threat of force will only
lead each side to counter-balance each other. Fact: Greece has never owned Cyprus. Fact: The
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus does not exist to anyone outside of the minds of the
Turks. In addition, maintaining a bi-ethnic and bi-communal form of government only
reinforces the radical appropriation and application of ―otherness‖ within the practical domain.
Dichotomizing human from human on an ethnic basis merely breeds intolerance in which both
sides are likely to deny any common cultural ground between groups so that no other group
can refute the other. These ‗primordial‘ claims are highly corrosive to political integration,
because these claims legitimize a system of unimpeachable values and truths. Mary Follett
states it beautifully,
―There are three ways of dealing with difference: domination, compromise, and
integration. By domination only one side gets what it wants; by compromise neither side gets
what it wants; by integration we find a way by which both sides may get what they wish.‖
Therefore, if we eliminate the option of domination of either side and we know that
compromise in bi-communal terms has failed every time, then based on the simple model
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process of elimination, the last option left is integration. However, any forced attempt for
national integration will be problematic and destructive.
Greece has decided that previous hopes of enosis were no longer practicable or possible.
Since 1974 Turkish Cypriots have been economically depressed (after inheriting economic
problems from the mainland). Greek Cypriots, on the other hand have been prospering
financially. Turkish Cypriots stand to gain economically through reintegration not only in the
overall economic prosperity, but also by avoiding the economic isolation from the rest of the
world that their current non-recognized status entails. Likewise, the Greek Cypriots stand to
gain in terms of recovering territory, lost homes, and property (Couloumbis 112). According to
US President Bill Clinton, ―We all do better when we work together. Our differences do matter,
but our humanity matters more‖. Although ethnicity does harness an intensely dynamic
political quality is it also equally (if not more) adaptive in nature. Ethnic identities are fluid,
socially constructed concepts that are formed internally and externally in relation to the outside
world. Instead of focusing on what makes them different, the polarized population of Cyprus
must recognize that as human beings we all share inherently the same human aspects. Selfunderstanding is illusory. Questioning the norms and values of one‘s own culture is critical in
grasping the bigger picture.
Again, ethnic conflict is far too complex to be resolved rationally. According to Moisi,
one cannot fully understand the world we live in without trying to integrate and understand its
emotions. He claims that confidence is the major factor in determining world health. He
explains that it is just as important on a national scale as it is on an individual level— Identity is
strongly linked with confidence or lack thereof. Confidence, he says, can be mapped through a
series of indicators which scientifically measure the degree of trust a population possesses in its
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own future through spending patterns, levels of investment, birthrates or surveys (similar to the
one Neil Jarman conducted in Belfast). A simple measure of confidence in Cyprus should be the
first step taken towards removing the Green Line.
Ultimately, the Cyprus problem is not going to vanish overnight but steps must be taken
to cultivate unity rather than division of the island through the use of interface barriers and bicommunal compromises. The reunification of Cyprus must include: more positive efforts from
politicians, more diverse and effective regeneration of interface areas, more cross-community
dialogue, as well as ‗confidence mapping‘. Historically, Cyprus and its people have always been
at the mercy of the dominant power in the area because it has been considered too small to exist
by itself. Cyprus has been bought and sold, transferred from ruler to ruler without the
inhabitants ever being consulted. As a result, Cypriots have fallen victim to an extremely
turbulent past. However, the political disasters since its independence in 1960 have been largely
self-inflicted. Therefore, the Cyprus Question can only truly be answered by the Cypriot people,
with the help of leaders who understand that when we compete we get some of it back; when
we cooperate we get it all back.
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"Our ability to reach unity in diversity will be the beauty and test of our civilization." - Gandhi
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